The Creative Mind: Kant, Hegel and the Complexity of Life in the 21st Century

Artwork: Through spirit’s gaze by Andrew James Campbell. Acrylic on torn paper. A4 1982. With kind permission of the artist. The source of the title is “The Spirit shall look out through matters gaze, and matter shall reveal the Spirits face” Sri Aurobindo

Kant and Hegel, 2.0

When Kant postulated, in a Cartesian manner, that we are the children of two distinct worlds, the cognitive and the empirical, and that we can derive clear-cut conclusions from there, he was rightfully criticized by Hegel that things may not be as easy as they seem. Assuming that we do not live in a dualist, but in a coherent material reality where the biological-cognitive domain emerges from physical groundings (despite enjoying distinct supervenient sets of freedom that moves the symbolic mind distant from its physical base), such a view entails an organic, rather than a Kantian-categorical model of how our mind, the world and others relate. As history progresses, Hegel’s subject-object even evolves and expands during cultural evolution. The concept of a subject-object information field was also introduced as a central paradigm by Eleanor Rosch in cognitive psychology.

It is not only the artists who create, but scientists, engineers, business-groups, culture, society and the world at large. Strictly speaking, all life that is self-sustaining and self-regulating requires creativity, the development of future-oriented, thus open developmental paths to persevere and to evolve. Without it, we would perish or our minds would devolve into repetitive, self-congruent fractal patterns. Once environmental conditions stall, so does evolution. Once environmental conditions become more dynamic, creative evolution is starting to get busy.

For Hegel, intuition and concept were just different aspects of the same subject-object unity within a common reality. Kant excelled in his insight that the freedom to reason about our world is a distinct mental property which might be explained by, but not reduced to neurological processes. On the other hand, we can spin Hegel’s argument regarding Kant further: Not only is humanity a mean within itself which cannot (and should not) be instrumentalized, but the same argument extends to the material conditions that safeguard our integrity as rational agents. Examples are the access to education, the availability of creative tools and stimulating environments to develop one’s faculties, the integrity of body, the malleability and adequate development of the brain, the practical autonomy as a person and so on and so forth.

The freedom of our mind matters as much as the material conditions that enable it. The extended Hegelian argument goes as follows: If there is in principle only one physical reality (nature, also following Spinoza’s path here), then the laws of self-governed freedom must apply to all; not only content and form but also the physical grounds that allow conceptual form and mental content to emerge.

The creative mind works from both ends, from the conceptual-cognitive as much as from the intuitive-emotive. Modern psychology and neuroscience have dismissed the mechanical idea of people as thinking machines; or ‘thinking animals’ as Descartes described himself in his Meditations. Without emotion, we could not think, an argument elaborated upon by neurologist António Damásio in his book ‘Descartes’ Error’. Without the empirical reality of our embodied minds, our needs, desires and vulnerabilities, we would have no motivation and no grounding to come up with a single thought. From a Hegelian perspective, environment and mind, intuition and concept, object and subject constitute each other reciprocally as a function of environment. This approach makes more sense than postulating ad hoc metaphysical ideas about life and reality, simply because reciprocality (bi-directional, mutually constituting causality) can be measured and verified scientifically as a phenomenon of our common reality. We can measure and interpret the role of creativity in our lives, although we have made little attempts so far to value the role of creativity in upbringing and education.

Creativity as a Vulnerable State of Mind

Being able to talk about things constitutes us as human beings that can marvel, play, discuss, react and ponder about the world and others. Verbal, non-verbal language and action act as the glue between empirical and mental domains, whereby empirical conditions become the material placeholders for mental content and processes. As such, the mental is folded inside the empirical conditions that surround it. From a phenomenological perspective, we could call this the empirical bracketing of mental content. Creativity, as a bracketed process, evolves in the gentle, protected space where empirical conditions are not too tight to suffocate or destroy creative freedom and not too loose that the mind has only a paucity of environmental stimuli to fall back upon.

Creativity finds itself among adjacent human faculties. According to Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of Intelligence, the creative intelligence is complemented by analytical and practical intelligence. His choice of categories is peculiar as it echoes the underlying matrix of the information field; namely that the polarized object-subject field collapses between its two poles (creative/ analytic) and concludes in action (pragmatic application and creative expression).

The creative action reveals itself always a collapse, a judgment call, a point where subject and object, mind and physical conditions unite. Subjective and objective information is woven into a coherent fabric by the loom of life in which we appear as finite beings within a practically infinite process. It is in our actions (inclusive of speech-acts and electronic interaction) that we constitute ourselves as rational beings. Spinoza might have added that those who dedicate their intellect to the search of such truth are blessed. Truth-searchers are enlightened as they recognize humbly their necessary incompleteness and fallibility. They remain mindful as they position themselves as responsible, autonomous beings. Like a glass of water, the fluidity of the water serves as a metaphor for creativity while the composedness of a rational mind, the function of the glass, holds potentials together. Creative processes need ratio as its guiding vector while ratio depends on creative processes as its source of inspiration, its ground for innovation and renewal.

Dimensions of Creativity

Regarding the dimensionality of creativity, much depends on our point of view. On the level of object-materiality, the creative mind recombines objects and shapes them within information hierarchies. We extract features, recognize patterns, chain and cluster, copy and paste, recombine and sort, analyse and synthesise, create interactive building blocks, define a system’s syntax (such as computer languages) to serve an instrumental purpose and so on. Object-materiality also engages our senses and emotions to which it guides our decision-making. The latter not only serves to create more pleasing outcomes but, in combination with our mental faculties, to create sustainable outcomes that are beneficial to all. This is the level of material design and hypothetical imperatives.

On the level of subject-object and inter-subjectivity, semantics appear on the horizon and we are dealing with what the Philosophy of Mind has defined as qualia. The creative mind takes semantics and qualia into consideration to create new forms, to morph, to evaluate, to restructure typology, to diversify in order for creations to serve and reflect the plethora of the human lifeworld and experience. As life’s paths are developmental open, so must creations serve the openness towards our shared future. As we need information and data to process semantics and qualia, we could call this type of creative processes ‘In-formations’ (to put into a form) since they address the development of ideas based on facts (idea), the meaningful creation of typologies (typos) in order to relate ideas to concepts and the need to change the overall form of structures (morphe) to suit human needs. On this second level, we design not only artefacts but systems. In system design, empathy is critical. The rational grounding of empathy lies firstly in the Kantian recognition that all individuals regardless of particulars are categorical representatives of mankind and secondly in the notion that no single man-made system stands in isolation of another. Hence, our emotional interest in the plight of other stakeholders is a ‘rational emotion’ (from a Kantian perspective). In endorsing empathy, we recognize the state of the rational grounding of others. We not only accept other’s dignity, but we also respect the systems they engage to make sense of the world. Ideally, we co-create systems.

Finally, on the level of environmental interaction, creativity transcends the subject-object. We interpret, re-define, constitute our social Selves, embed our lives in cultural memory, make gutsy lifetime decisions and undertake deep emotional investments, develop concepts, get inspired by intuitions and think critically about the relationships between ourselves and our future possibilities in the context of the environment. Since we are dealing with a global and holistic view of the subject-object phenomenon and its continuing transformations, we could name this type of creative processes ‘Transcendations’. It defines all processes that transcend their self-congruent borders and reformulate a system’s local particulars in view of global development and emergence. From a psychological perspective, cognitive dissonance and cognitive restructuring are the keywords.

From a scientific perspective, looking through our mental lens, we just defined different levels of detail and interaction, whereby each point of view enjoys its particular merit. All three levels of engagement challenge our individual and collective competencies, in particular with regard to increasing system complexity.

To conclude, creativity is not an arbitrary subjective faculty that escapes objective measure. This would be both the wrong perception as well as the wrong underlying question. The whole point of intact (flowing and exchanging) information fields is not to infer a preferred view within the object-subject (e.g., a spiritualized mind over matter belief or big data manipulating personal integrity) but to realize that the creative process requires a formal scaffolding and modes of creative processing in order to inform qualitative and quantitative aspects of research and investigation. To this extent, creativity is perhaps also the deepest political force of all, more profound than any ideology ever could, as we find our new historical role as designers of globally compatible and beneficial systems. Measuring our aspirations against real-world outcomes, the openness towards critique and ongoing improvement becomes our most precious virtue. The higher our standards, the stricter our self-critique.

The Creative Reasoning of Actors

But who are the drivers of change? The material grounding of good design is stakeholders, not shareholders or onlookers. It is only when participants can bring their genuine interests, intuitions, perspectives, sufferings and passions to the table that we can complement those original requests by mindful conceptualizing, not by automated technocratic processes. Kant delivers the deciding argument here and I shall extend his proposition a bit. Only by critical reasoning as well as making our creative reasoning a matter of public discourse for the sake of a better lifeworld design, we can evade the pitfalls of dehumanizing our environment to the point where autonomy and freedom slip off our hands. The argument is that once the conditions for open systems creation become means to a purpose and surrender to hypothetical imperatives (such as e.g., by commercialisation or the maintenance of privilege at the expense of others), spaces for sensible negotiations and co-creations between stakeholders deteriorate or vanish. Creativity in the 21st century has never had so many options and has never been in so much peril of being instrumentalised. We need to work hard, stay open-minded, be patient, listen to our hearts and take uncomfortable risks for mind to matter.


Special thanks to Andrew James Campbell for all our conversations inspiring this script.

Metacognition (Part 2): What Makes Us Truly Human? A Literature Review

original robot picTo learn is to create: Educational robotics are a very recent trend that requires children and adolescents to plan, reason, experiment, create, play and learn from failure. In the process, they acquire and apply new knowledge. As in most such technology-based scenarios, students learn in teams. Photograph by Alain Herzog, 2015

The path of least resistance and least trouble is a mental rut already made. It requires troublesome work to undertake the alteration of old beliefs.

John Dewey

What makes us truly human? Part 1 of this series (‘What or how we think is not quite as important as how we can govern ourselves’) outlined the significance of metacognition on the individual and social level. It was concluded that the freedom to develop alternative solutions to a problem and to become self-aware of one’s own as well as others intentions, perspectives, feelings and interests constitute key competencies of the human condition. Without such freedom, our mind would simply follow environmental stimuli or tradition and we would barely be capable of developing a more complex and rewarding lifeworld.

The following review investigates the deeper structure of metacognition. It is divided into two sections. Section 1 provides an overview of leading concepts that investigate individual and social metacognition (ISM). Section 2 reviews the suitability of various theoretical frameworks in order to propose a unifying approach of how to measure metacognition in the context of autonomous (intrinsic) versus heteronomous (extrinsic) regulation.

1. The dimensionality of individual and social metacognition

Individual Metacognition: Self-Knowledge and Behavioral Control

The first formal model of individual metacognition was developed by John Flavell (Flavell, 1979, 1981) who was influenced by the constructivist psychology of Jean Piaget (Flavell, 1963). Flavell (1979) defined metacognition broadly as a person’s self-knowledge and regulation over her own cognition, an overarching concept that is shared in literature (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1976, 1979; Kuhn & Dean, 2004; Martinez, 2006; Paris & Winograd, 1990; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Schraw et al., 2006).  Metacognition is accompanied by metacognitive experiences such as the feeling of difficulty (or ease of learning), the experience of self-efficacy, affective states dealing with uncertainty and task motivation (Efklides, 2006, 2009, 2014; Flavell, 1981; Kleitman & Moscrop, 2010; Schneider, 2008; Zimmerman, 2008). Metacognitive experiences have been identified to play a critical role in self-enhancement motivation (Jiang & Kleitman, 2015) to support self-regulated learning (Boekaerts & Corno, 2005; Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2000; Dweck, 1998).

Metacognitive knowledge generally refers to the reflective knowledge that people have about their information processing skills which entail the knowledge of tasks, task complexity and the knowledge of strategies on how to cope with tasks. Corresponding metacognitive regulation describes the related executive skills of cognitive monitoring and self-regulation associated with metacognitive knowledge (Schraw et al., 2006; Schneider, 2008). Flavell’s original blueprint has since been extended considerably by other researchers.

Adding to the definition of metacognitive knowledge, several authors (Cross & Paris, 1988; Kuhn & Dean, 2004; Schraw et al., 2006) have identified declarative, procedural and conditional knowledge as its central components. Declarative knowledge refers to a learner’s self-knowledge of resources and abilities. Procedural knowledge refers to the knowledge of the purpose and the processes involved to solve problems and to self-regulate tasks (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Nelson, 1994, 1996) while conditional knowledge refers to knowing the conditions under which knowledge can be generated, transferred and applied (Schraw & Dennison, 1994).

The concept of metacognitive regulation has likewise been expanded upon and includes the planning and critical evaluation of cognitive tasks and goals (Brown, 1987; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Cross & Paris, 1988; Martinez, 2006; Paris &Winograd, 1990; Schraw et al., 2006; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Whitebread et al., 2009). Metacognitive planning entails the abilities of forethought (Pintrich, 2000), for example by goal setting and resource allocation, while Schraw & Moshman (1995) and Schraw & Dennison (1994) added debugging strategies to correct for comprehension and performance errors, information management strategies to process information more efficiently and comprehension monitoring to allow for the self-assessment of one’s learning.

Metacognitive regulation has been further segmented into (a) Cognitive monitoring, which refers to making self-aware judgments about one’s learning. (b) Metacognitive planning which, as outlined above, refers to the evaluation and employment of most efficient resources and strategies (Cross & Paris, 1988; Li et al., 2015; Schraw et al., 2006; Whitebread et al., 2009) and (c) Metacognitive evaluation, which refers to the ability of making metacognitive judgments and formulating monitored interpretations (Dunlosky& Metcalfe, 2009; Pintrich, 2000; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Wang, 2014).

Formulating a more holistic approach, Pressley, Borkowski, and Schneider (1989) have proposed the ‘Good Information Processing Model’ which also takes into consideration the elements of prior knowledge about the world, motivational orientation and the ease of employing successful strategies automatically. This model was later extended to include metacognitive self-regulation skills (Efklides, 2001; Schunk & Zimmerman, 1998, Schneider, 2008). The level of prior knowledge plays a large role in pedagogy as it defines the scope of a learner’s inner resources such as coherent concepts and internalised ideas.

Much of current research on metacognition deals predominantly with empowering student learners such as in literacy, reading and comprehension (Baker, 2008; Israel et al., 2005; Leopold & Leutner, 2015), developing self-efficacy (Aydin, 2006), improving problem-solving (Cornoldi et al, 2015; Wismath & Orr, 2015), essay writing (Surat et al., 2014) and mathematics (Desoete & Veenman, 2006; Özcan & Erktin, 2015; Kleden, 2015). Other studies have focused on peripheral topics such as linking metacognition to worrying and sleep (Thielsch, Andor, &Ehring, 2015; Thielsch et al., 2015) or consumer knowledge discrimination (Pillai et al., 2015). Not much research has been conducted in areas such as the workplace, organisational decision-making, culture or politics.

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Picture (MIT): Prof. Tommi Jaakkola during a class in AI “Introduction to Machine Learning”. The more complex a society, the more relevant becomes cognitive and metacognitive regulation

As part of self-regulated learning, metacognition has also been linked to critical thinking skills (Bowell & Kemp, 2010; Dwyer et al., 2014; Felton & Kuhn, 2007; Halpern, 1998; Ku & Ho, 2010; Kuhn, 1999; Magno, 2010; Mayer & Goodchild, 1990; Olson & Astington, 1993; Schroyens, 2005) since metacognition is self-correcting and refers to the epistemological question ‘What do I know and how do I know it?’ (Kuhn, 1999, p. 18).Critical thinking skills involve executive functions for difficult cognitive tasks, such as recognizing assumptions, making inferences and deductions, formulating interpretations and evaluating arguments (Magno, 2010). Despite general agreement on the overall construct of metacognition, Kuhn & Dean (2004) pointed out that there is e.g., a large divide between psychological researchers, emphasizing on objective standards, and practitioners who expect students to be empowered to contribute to a democratic society. Both standpoints beg reconciliation. An overview of the general taxonomy of individual metacognition is summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Systematic overview on the concept of  individual metacognition by the author (click to enlarge)

Social Metacognition: The Awareness of Others

No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition

The official advent of social metacognition in social psychology was marked by a publication of an edited volume on metacognition by Dardenne, Lories & Yzerbyt (1998) which connected topics that are of particular interest to social psychologists, such as relating feeling-of-knowing judgments and theories about the social influence on memory with topics such as stereotyping, prejudice and social bias correction.  Since then, social metacognition has been established as an essential topic in social psychology (Bless & Forgas, 2000; Mischel, 1998).

One of the key issues has been, ever since, differentiating social metacognition from individual metacognition. Briñol (2012) argued that metacognition is primarily defined as thinking about one’s own (vs. others’) thinking, since primary thought is causally more efficient if it appears in one’s own head. Social metacognition is represented for Briñol in many ways, for example as an individual’s mentalizing about social objects (e.g., the perception of family and relationships), thoughts shared by a community (thoughts about others’ thoughts) or thoughts communicated to others.

Briñol rejected the proposal by Jost and colleagues (1998) who called for an expansionist approach of social metacognition on the grounds that the true agent of mentalization is still the individual subject. In this proposal the authors called for the inclusion of (a) mentalizing about other people’s cognition, (b) momentary convictions, such as ‘the feeling of knowing’ (Nelson & Nahrens, 1994) and (c) descriptive general beliefs of how the mind works, such as beliefs about intelligence (Dweck, 2013) as well as normative beliefs of how the mind should or should not work, such as deferring to make stereotype judgments about others (Yzerbyt et al., 1994).

Jost and colleagues (1998,  p. 140) argued, with experimental evidence from studies on familiarity heuristics, that ‘fleeting feelings’ are often guided by metacognitive states (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Begg, Armour & Kerr, 1985; Jacoby et al., 1989; Metcalfe; Strack & Bless, 1994). The authors argued that self-concepts such as beliefs about self-efficacy (Bandura, 1991; Ferrari, 1996) or the nature of intelligence (Dweck, 2013) are modelled via social learning processes and thus need to be included in social metacognition.

The opposing positions of Briñol et al. (2012) and Jost et al. (1998) can be reconciled by putting into perspective that social metacognition plays out on a gradient scale between implicit, automated processes and explicit, reflected mental processes. In this light, Schraw & Moshman (1995) proposed a taxonomy defining (a) tacit (b) explicit-informal and (c) explicit-formal metacognitive theories. Tacit theories (a) are acquired, constructed and applied without one’s knowledge. For example, a teacher’s epistemological assumption of how adults learn describes his tacit, implicit theory about students’ learning and decision-making (Kagan, 1992; Sternberg & Caruso, 1985). Explicit-informal theories (b) imply a subject’s awareness and knowledge of some of the mental content, while the rudimentary framework still lacks conscious justification of beliefs and their underlying assumptions.   On the level of explicit-informal theories people reflect purposefully and systematically on their actions and modify their future thinking and performance (Kuhn et al., 1992), differentiating between empirical and formal content (Hergenhahn & Olson, 1993). Finally, in explicit-formal theories (c) people become fully aware of their mental states as demonstrated, e.g., in Problem-based Learning where tutors facilitate metacognitive reasoning by asking group-members to provide arguments for their assumptions, beliefs and propositions (Barrows, 1992; Barrows & Wee, 2007).

Another approach to frame the multi-dimensionality of social metacognition, to pick up on Briñol’s argument of personal mental efficacy, is to differentiate how social metacognition is causally evoked by individual, social and environmental input. Kim and colleagues (2013) asked about the eliciting source of metacognition and propose a dual-agent (individual and social) organization of social metacognition. The authors argued that a single individualistic or social perspective by itself cannot sufficiently explain e.g., how learners with weak metacognitive skills can overcome temporary failures (Kim et al., 2013). Based on the concept of socially shared metacognition (Iiskala et al., 2011) and regulation within groups (Vauras et al., 2003) they concluded that the social level acts as an integrated agent in the form of consensual, participatory goal setting and collective planning. The learning environment evokes, as a separate layer, social metacognition by framing problems of different task complexity and conceptual demand. Individual metacognitive reasoning is for the authors causally defined as ‘due to oneself’ while social-level reasoning is defined ‘due to others’ (Kim et al., 2013, p. 388).

A neglected field of research is the relationship between empathy and social metacognition. The underlying question is how can we be motivated to take the plight of others into perspective if there is no prior emotional identification with the other, this is if we cannot recognize the other as an equal human being despite particular differences. The central role of empathy in combination with social metacognition is however fully recognized in Clinical Science (Eichbaum, 2014: Stansfield et al., 2015).

2. The suitability of theoretical frameworks to measure psychological motivations

If the goal of the research is to measure the entire spectrum of autonomous versus (competing) heteronomous types of regulation, few psychological frameworks offer a useful conceptual base. For example, the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991, 2002) works under the assumption of individual, goal-directed behavior based on a person’s attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioral control and individual intentionality. Like most rational-choice theories, the approach does not take into consideration heteronomous factors such as the influence of social habits, social milieu and interaction effects involving cultural context, social norms or group influence (Manstead, 2011).

On the other end of the spectrum, Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Taifel & Turner, 1979) works under the assumption that it is one’s group association that creates a sense of belonging and creates self-esteem, honour, pride and identity. SIT defines the subsequent processes that create social identity as (a) social categorization, where people categorize and define themselves and others in relation to each other, (b) social identification, where people adopt the identity of their new ingroup and (c) social comparison, where one’s ingroup is compared against outgroups, evoking judgments about the other groups’ worthiness as well as one’s own. SIT does conceptually not account for individual reasoning to transcend identities beyond group affiliation.

Self-determination Theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan et al., 2012), by comparison, takes as a motivational theory the entire spectrum of intrinsic and extrinsic types of motivation into account. It is argued that high-quality forms of motivation support the human needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan, 1995) while social context and cultural factors may even undermine motivation and volition. SDT is empirically well supported across disciplines (Deci et al., 1999; Chircov et al., 2003; Guntert, 2015; Hagger et al., 2015; Masden et al., 2014; Ng et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2006; Van Berghe et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2013) and has demonstrated cross-cultural validity and reliability (Gagné et al., 2014; Grouzet et al., 2005; Sheldon et al., 2009; Soenens, 2012; Vlachopoulos et al., 2013; Zhou & Deci, 2009). SDT differentiates between five basic types of self-regulation (Ryan et al., 2012, p. 221-223) which shall be briefly described in relation to sociocultural context.

(1) Externally motivated and control-dependent behavior is characterized by the regulation by external rewards and punishments (Skinner, 1953) which exclude the Self. Beyond physical conditioning, rewards and punishments are also represented by peoples’ weighing between payoffs versus costs for complying with social norms (Sherif, 1935; Asch, 1951; Milgram, 1963). Hedonic adaptation (Diener et al., 2009; Kahneman et al., 1999), for example, can be regarded as a result of external motivation.

(2) Introjected regulation includes mental models that have been partially internalized by the self. In this case, the motivation for behavior is governed by the avoidance of shame and guilt or providing for socialized self-esteem rewards (Beer, 2014; James & Amato, 2013; Walker & Bright, 2009) such as in the honor cultures of the Mediterranean and the Middle-East.  Introjected regulation is also facilitated by inferences provided by common sense – (Heider, 2013) and folk psychology (Hutto & Ratcliffe, 2007; Kelley, 1992; Kruglanski et al. 2010) which largely supports culturally-shared, naïve assumptions “how people think they think about the social world” (Wegner & Vallacher, 1981, p. 226). On the other hand, loss of honor is typically followed by feelings of shame, feeling disrespected, disempowered and can be responded with aggression and violence.

(3) Identified regulation (social norm regulation) entails that people identify with their enactment of behavior and assume responsibility for their actions and they relate internalized social norms and values to reflected personal consequences for enacting them. Underlying social norms function on this level as injunctive norms (Cialdini and Trost, 2011), an intricate system of reciprocal expectations that society formulates towards the individual and, in return, expectations of the individual to how others should behave (Bicchieri, 2006).

(4) External integrated regulation describes a type of motivation where people do not only reflect upon personal and social norms, values and identifications, but they bring into congruence the claims and perspectives of others as the basis for cooperation. The causation of such reflective thought due to others is a hallmark of social metacognition (Kim et al., 2013).

(5) Intrinsic motivation implies that a person acts according to his or her personal aspirations. Behavior is initiated because it is experienced as personally enriching and engaging, independent of external stimuli. Intrinsic motivation entails the ability to resist habitual responding and to base decision-making on motivating values which are not a function of anxiety, defense and conditioned response. People seek to proactively develop positive social relations, environmental mastery, self-acceptance, personal growth, autonomy and purpose in life (Ryff, 1989; Kállay & Rus, 2014; Li, 2014) by free personal choice (Deci, 1971, 1975).

To this extent, intrinsic motivation is linked to individual metacognition for developing goal-directed behavior via mental strategies (Coutinho & Neuman, 2008; Ee et al., 2009; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998), while monitoring and controlling for adverse environmental influences that may frustrate, inhibit or prevent individual development (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).

From the perspective of SDT, ISM can be conclusively understood as forms of external integrated and intrinsic regulation. Heteronomous forms of regulation, by contrast, are usually encoded as folk- and cultural beliefs (introjected regulation), social norms and conventions (identified regulation) as well as hedonic well-being (both on an individual and social level with others). This conceptual approach entails a less polarized concept since in everyday life peoples’ lives are ruled by more complex types of motivation that combine individual and collective motives. As Chirkov and colleagues noted, “Because autonomy concerns volition, persons who are strongly connected with others often function with those others’ interests in mind. Put differently, if others are integrated within oneself doing for or conforming with those others could be fully volitional.” (Chirkov et al., 2003, p.103).

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Picture: Instead of looking for solutions by respecting and integrating the perspective of others, modern societies often behave like tribes. Photo from an indigenous protest in Brazil during the UN Rio+20 summit. Source: KeystoneUSA-ZUMA / Rex Features

Conclusion: What makes us truly human?

In terms of research approaches, what appears of interest are not necessarily all possible forms of human motivation but those that are most relevant to generate specific outcomes. Since we are interested to empower human agency on all levels, we need to be aware of motivations compromising individual and social freedom and autonomy. In this light, the institutional embeddedness of metacognitive practices is of particular interest here, both in terms of the internal democratic management of organisations as well as developing socially inclusive services and sustainable design for clients. As pointed out in Part I of this series, the connection between empathy, social metacognition and the development of ethical concepts has not yet been fully investigated and lacks empirical research.

Self-awareness, self-regulation, forethought, logical reasoning, creativity, empathy, perspective-taking and the mindfulness of others are some of the key features that make us truly human. We have just begun to grasp the basic grammar of human agency.

References

Due to the long list, all references to Part 1 and Part 2 of this series are listed as PDF here Literature Review, References Joana Kompa.

Metacognition (Part1): What or How We Think is Not Quite as Important as How We Can Govern Our Reasoning

MCDANIN EC023

Photograph: Al Gore explaining data findings on global warming for his documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (Picture Credit: The Hollywood Reporter)

Reason in a creature is a faculty of widening the rules and purposes of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct; it acknowledges no limits to its projects. Reason itself does not work instinctively but requires trial, practice, and instruction in order to progress gradually from one level of insight to another.

Immanuel Kant

In contemporary social and cognitive psychology, the problem of human empowerment remains one of the overarching topics of debate. Discourse encompasses the question to which extent human cognition and behaviour is regulated heteronomous, based on an external locus of control, or autonomously, based on an internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Applied psychology attempts to foster and develop what Bandura (2006) has identified as the core properties of human agency, which are intentionality, forethought, self-regulation, self-reactiveness and self-reflectiveness. According to Bandura, people are not merely ‘onlookers of their behaviour’ (Bandura, p. 164), but proactive subjects capable of creating desired futures.

Similar to Bandura’s recent call for an ‘Agentic Psychology’ which is advocating self-directed human agency, Self-Determination Theory (SDT) proposes a related model of human empowerment based on a theory of motivation, differentiating between various forms of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971, 1975; Ryan et al., 2012). The underlying assumption of SDT states that motivations are driven by the intrinsic human needs for social relations, the development of competence and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2012).

Historically, the concept of heteronomy versus autonomy and regarding people as autonomous, responsible and rational agents leads back to the Age of Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant advocated in his famous paper titled ’What is Enlightenment?’ from 1784, to not only use one’s own private understanding but also to make public use of one’s reasoning to free ourselves from self-incurred immaturity (Kant & Beck, 1959).

The Overarching Structure of Metacognition

Analogously in psychology, the reflected private and public use of reason (cognition) are known as metacognition. Individual metacognition is broadly defined as one’s ‘thinking about thinking’ (Flavell, 1979), the ability to reflect critically about one’s own reasoning, due to oneself, while social metacognition is defined to reflect about one’s own cognition as it is motivated by others (Kim, Park, Moore & Varma, 2013).

For example, the statement ‘I think of my options first before I start making plans’ is perceived ‘due to myself’, representing individual metacognition. By comparison, the proposition ‘I first think about the consequences for others before I make a decision’ is set causally implied ‘due to others’ as a social object, subsequently representing social metacognition.

Metacognition comprises of cognitive knowledge (knowledge about knowledge) as well as cognitive regulation (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1976, 1979; Martinez, 2006; Paris & Winograd, 1990; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Schraw et al., 2006).

Cognitive regulation is further segmented into (a) cognitive monitoring, referring to making self-aware judgments about one’s learning. This entails metacognitive experiences, such as the awareness of task complexity (Efklides, 2006) and self-enhancement motivation (Jiang & Kleitman, 2015), (b) cognitive planning, referring to the evaluation and employment of most efficient resources and strategies (Cross & Paris, 1988; Li et al., 2015; Schraw et al., 2006; Whitebread et al., 2009) and (c) cognitive evaluation, referring to the ability of making metacognitive judgments and formulating monitored interpretations (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Wang, 2014).

Several authors (Beran, 2013, Carruthers, 2012; Chambon et al., 2014; Peña-Ayala, 2015; Proust, 2014; Kloo, & Rohwer, 2012; Metcalfe et al., 2013; Schraw and Moshman; 1995) have emphasized the role of metacognition for human agency. For the authors, agency emerges not only on the level of efficient mental information processing such as information storage and retrieval (Nelson & Nahrens, 1990) but on the level of regulation, monitoring, interpretation and evaluation of thoughts.

Metacognition is often described in research as being part of a dual system that complements automated and habitual cognition. Daniel Kahneman (2013), citing Stanowich and West (2000), conceptualizes a dual blueprint of human cognition. He proposed an efficient first-order system that facilitates intuitive decision-making, driven by impulses and conditioned responses, while a second-order system operates self-aware, deliberate and effortful. The latter is enabled by executive functions (Banich, 2009; Chan et al., 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Most importantly, self-regulation enables the second-order system to correct for cognitive bias (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman, 2011; Martin & Staple, 1998; Petty et al., 2007). A limitation of the individual-based dual system conceptualization is that it does not take into consideration external heteronomous factors that influence people, such as folk theories, group pressure or social norms.

In conclusion, metacognitive regulation is a reliable indicator of autonomous regulation. It is only when individuals are able to defer habitual, automated judgment, to critically reflect upon their thoughts and to be able to analyse and correct internalized mental content and strategies that they assume independent, autonomous agency. Vierkant (2013) argued in support of this notion that our self-reflective abilities enable the human mind to go offline, directing it away from environmental stimuli and towards itself, unlike routinized minds.

The Social Efficacy of Metacognition

The dichotomy of heteronomous versus autonomous regulation exists, to illustrate its dimensionality with Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Systems Theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), on various social levels as follows:

(a) On an individual level, a lack of reflected cognitive regulation is correlated with numerous mental disorders, which is why metacognitive approaches play a central role in counselling and psychotherapy (Dimaggio et al., 2015; Thakur & Roy, 2015; Van Donkergoed et al., 2014; Wells, 2000). Approaches to psychotherapy, such as REBT (Ellis & MacLaren, 2005) or CBT (Feltham & Horton, 2012), are based on self-aware cognitive restructuring. Metacognitive skills are also positively related to mastering difficult life transitions and relationship issues (Varmecky, 2012). Regarding education, a great number of empirical studies on individual metacognition focus on the effectiveness of students’ learning (Aydin, 2016; Cornoldi et al., 2015; Hudesman et al., 2013; Leopold & Leutner, 2015; Zepeda et al., 2015).

(b) On the level of small groups, metacognition is a prerequisite for collaborative, evidence-based problem-solving and teamwork (Frith, 2012; Nansubuga et al., 2015; Nonose et al., 2014; Wismath, & Orr, 2015). A good example would be the constructivist pedagogy of Problem-based Learning (PBL) which started in medical education (Barrows, 1992) and has since then extended to numerous academic faculties (Amador et al., 2006; Duch et al., 2001). PBL is explicitly encouraging metacognitive reasoning (Barrows & Wee, 2007; Downing et al., 2009) within tutor-based groups to research, evaluate and develop competing interpretations and multiple solutions to a problem. By contrast, a lack of metacognitive competence can lead to social effects such as groupthink (Janis, 1982), blind conformity and compliance (Asch, 1956; Levitan & Verhulst, 2015; Mugny, 1984), compromising both democratic decision-making as well as individual critical reasoning (Comstock, 2015; Kuhn, 1991).

(c) On the level of large groups, group conflicts in collective and individualist cultures are intensely debated in cross-cultural psychology. The role of metacognition within social conflicts has however not yet been deeply investigated. Boroş and colleagues (2010), confirming similar findings by Earley &Mosakowski (2000), for example, concluded that horizontal collectivism and individualism (groups where members regard themselves as equal) are more likely to adopt cooperative conflict resolution styles. Examples for heteronomous social regulation in this light are conflicts evoked by outgroup-avoidant and socially exclusive cognitive beliefs, such as traditional belief systems and ideologies (De Juan, 2015; Hahn et al., 2015; Thagard, 2015).

The examples suggest that although individual- and social metacognition (ISM) may originate as higher order thinking skills neurologically and functionally in the same mid frontal brain regions (Shimamura, 2009), the plethora of issues that ISM involves extend over the entire continuum of social spheres. On an (a) individual level, metacognition supports, maintains and develops personal and occupational functioning. On the level of (b) small groups, metacognition advances the ability to collaborate successfully with others, while on the level of (c) large groups, metacognition relates to the regulation of argument-based societal discourse and behavioral changes in the face of global challenges.

Metacognition and Culture

Culture is another Terra Incognita from a metacognitive point of view. Despite intense research such as in the educational sector, little is known about cultural differences in individual and social metacognition (ISM) across social contexts, in particular, contrasted against non-metacognitive, heteronomous modes of regulation. Most studies that compare, for example, differences between individualistic and collectivist cultures have focussed on comparing psychological concepts such as, e.g., self-esteem, well-being and emotion, attribution styles, social obligations, communication styles or negotiation and conflict resolution styles, as outlined in the meta-analyses by Oyserman and colleagues (2002), but not explicitly ISM.

Since collectivist cultures, unlike individualist cultures, are defined in contemporary research by group identities regulating individual cognition (Hofstede 1984, 2001; Triandis 1995, 2004), the question arises how cognitive and metacognitive regulation in collectivist cultures is structured differently from individualist cultures. The knowledge of such structure or pattern would e.g., not only allow for a more unbiased cross-cultural psychological perspective in terms of fully recognizing individual as well as collective agency, insights would be furthermore beneficial to inform the design of educational strategies to promote more efficient learner-centered education systems across cultures (Händel, Artelt & Weinert, 2013).

Last but not least, a very neglected area of scientific research is art. As artists continuously evaluate, assess and experiment with their works, the question arises if and how self-guided intuition and playful self-development prestructure metacognition. The importance of art, theatre and music education for the early scaffolding of ISM in this respect cannot be underestimated. Creativity is the watchword, such as involving children in higher order thinking skills, fostering self-worth and self-esteem, encouraging them to experiment and express new ideas and offering children mentors when it comes to developing creative approaches (Craft, 2001).

Scientific Prospects and Dangers of Technological Misuse

As a prerequisite to promote ISM, researchers will need to be able to measure the prevalence of its various forms and subtypes, contrasted against heteronomous modes of regulation in order to derive a causal motivational model. Besides improving systems for human development there is always the possibility of abuse as well. Once we can measure reliably the most relevant heteronomous motivations within individuals and groups, we can predict fairly accurately the types of attitudes, perspective-taking preferences and problem-solving strategies that social players bring into their negotiations and planning scenarios. The more decision-making is based on heteronomous motivations, the more accurately we can make predictions. This is a fascinating as much as a scary scenario. Given the recent capacity of Big Data Analysis and its integration into machine learning (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2014; Siegel, 2016), continuing commercialization favours the management of predictable consumer and voter behavior within the logical prospect of conditioning large and more homogeneously motivated populations.

The opposite analysis can be made too. The stability of democratic consensus could, e.g., be measured by the growing or declining influence of heteronomous motivations on evidence-based strategies and reason-based agreements.

Truly free from prediction are only those who can reflect openly and critically upon their own and others’ thinking and can suspend judgment. Given that heteronomous types of motivation usually evolve convergently, suggesting quick, intuitive and simple answers, rational agents qualify, in the face of contradicting and overwhelming impulses, through their ability to self-correct their thinking while not losing account of the balance of arguments at hand (Kuhn, 1991).

 

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In a World of Global Turmoil, Which Hills Shall We Run For and Which Tribes Should We Join?

The following article is a thank-you to all followers and visitors of my Blog. Approaching 90,000 views, this entry is a reflection on how global and local policy making is intrinsically linked to social psychology issues of social empowerment and cooperative problem-solving.

The Awareness of Crisis

Our world has entered a stage where we fight for ecological survival and depend on deep societal change on a global scale to make this happen. Rising inequality and the decline of middle classes in developed nations pose the question who, if not educated middle classes, should lead progress. The additional obstacles set out by populist movements, from Brexit to the dysfunctional governance of Donald Trump, have cast shadows over the ability of the Western civilisation to solve the pressing problems of our time. Unlike the US, Europe is geographically exposed to the turmoils created in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa. If for example, climate change continues at its current rate, hundreds of millions of climate refugees might knock on Fortress Europe instead of the currently few million trying to escape the terror of war in Syria.

Many European politicians have understood that solving this conundrum is only possible by developing our primary and secondary neighbours. This translates into fostering political and economic stability and setting the prospect of moderate wealth for the populations of Africa and the Middle-East. The age of nationalistic ‘Me first’ politics is counterproductive in a world where wealth has become an interdependent factor. In a world where everybody is looking for the best deal, everybody loses. Access to education and decent public health care are key prerequisites in the process of distributed and sustainable wealth-creation.

For starters, education and health care never work on a neoliberal market-based scheme of demand and supply. If a person has cancer, cancer cannot be exchanged for a cheaper illness. We can neither return a pre-existing condition because we don’t like its potential ramifications nor can we make our grandparents younger. If we need to provide higher education to our children, they cannot be adopted by a wealthier family to pay for costly tuition fees. Young people cannot pay for education with money that their parents don’t have. The easy way out of student loans translates into debilitating debts where each new opportunity is tied to an added obstacle to future growth. In order to ensure fair public access, the future of health care and education emerges therefore not by market forces but from supranational government-initiated networks. Intellectual elites, for the sake of not undermining their own legitimacy, share the responsibility to contribute to democratic global development.

The recent G20 summit in Hamburg served as an example of maximum investment in bringing world leaders together while yielding minimum outcomes. A community of economic self- interest representation stalls global development and does not facilitate significant cooperative projects that do not only benefit particular investors but global societal development. The lack of democratic legitimization of the world economy has never been more visible. But instead of learning from the lessons of emerging populism, world leaders continue to propagate neoliberal policies.

The Forces Within the Crisis

We see the transformation of capitalism represented by two dominating attitudes. The first is a progressive stand, represented by civil rights groups, NGOs, WHO- and UN-initiatives, attempt to transform and empower communities by bridging systemic ecological, social and biographic divides. The second, diametric aspect is resistance to change. By defending traditional cultural practices, privilege, shareholder interests and protecting monopolies, powerful groups maintain their dominance and influence. Caught in a cycle of self-preservation, they disconnect from social immersion and stall innovation by drafting policies that maintain corporate deregulation. Needless to mention that unilateral stakeholder defensiveness works diametral to an already volatile social contract.

The effects of populism, as I have experienced first hand in Thailand, are toxic not only to the extent of polarising populations during their reign, but to leave populations divided for generations after. Rifts about the ideology of political leadership run deep within the workplace, families and even personal relationships. The long-term effect of populism is the emergence of salient and socially exclusive group identities that undermine social contracts which are already threatened by the particularity of stakeholder interests that puts money before people.

Image: Sponsors of the American Diabetes Association: Obvious conflict of interest violations are not an issue in neoliberal philosophy. Screenshot from the documentary ‘What the Health’ (Anderson & Kuhn, 2017).

 

The perhaps biggest paradigm shift over the past decades is represented by the fact that the current Economy 3.0 model, which is based on democratic consensus among competing stakeholders, turns into a self-defeating system once the finite resources for maintaining exclusive stakeholderships become apparent. There is a widespread scientific consensus, backed by collective experiences of environmental disasters, that the ecological and social costs of doing business cannot be outsourced at the expense of society and our ecosphere indefinitely. The latter development is a negative feedback loop which is disruptive to businesses and communities alike. Popular examples are the emission scandals of Volkswagen and other carmakers, the pollution of oceans by microplastic and the harmful side-effects of a highly industrialised agriculture, in particular promoting monocultures, intensive livestock breeding and its associated high meat consumption. The alliance of food industries (to make people ill) and big pharma (to keep them this way as a stable source of income) is no coincidence. As shady property developers in Germany that prey on refinancing run-down housing estates occupied by social welfare recipients demonstrate, the crisis and misery of many have become a lucrative business for a few. Hiding in offshore accounts or in the darknet, authorities stall preventing criminals from targeting vulnerable populations and eroding their fragile social networks. In other cases, multinational corporations promote harmful products and services. Forces at work are certainly not in favour of progressive initiatives that face powerful adversaries.

Challenges to Transition

By contrast, the Economy 4.0 model promotes cooperation between the Civil Society, Government and Economy. Although the sustainable approach of Economy 4.0 is backed by more transparent collaborative accounts, the question arises how a transition from Economy 3.0 to 4.0 can be facilitated. The frictions created by populist policies and the limitations of stakeholder consensus have already been sketched out, which is how conflicts within the concurrent global transformation emerge. Political agendas that served nations well in the past are increasingly unable to inform new conceptual directions needed within a global environment. Borders to future growth are not only based on the limitation of available resources but also to the degree that social resources can be instrumentalized and exploited. It is not only that resources have a quantitative limit to availability, but that people rightfully expect a decent quality of life.

Supported by media discourse, international exchange and educational initiatives, awareness has emerged that people’s lives are compromised by the same protective stakeholder attitudes which decades ago still served as a guarantor of wealth. The defiant stance of workers in traditional industries, such as the coal- and steel industries, is a symptomatic expression of the dilemma that people are driven into when corporate decision makers fail to provide future prospects for their employees who have thoroughly internalised the limited perspective of their employer’s libertarian ideology. Replacing old ideologies by revolutionary new ones renders likewise futile since the question of the accountability of social change leadership persists. In our particular historical situation, we share the ownership of globalised problems, if we agree or not, which is a significant shift from a single stakeholder perspective that only follows individual business interests.

Image: Solar panels in India. Picture credit UK Department for International Development

Lastly, the dynamics and cascading nature of global problems force all participants to a fast and efficient prototyping of solutions. To avoid prolonged ill-design of policies, problem-solving and social re-design cycles require distributed multi-perspective assessment systems. The philosophy of reflecting cooperation is a huge shift from political parties designing and sugar-coating their particular group-agendas (assuming the mandate of active decision-makers) and presenting it to their voters (assuming the mandate of passive decision-takers). A more proactive, collaborative democratic approach represents, to this extent, not only a framework to substantiate social fairness but it serves as a framework for sustainable social problem-solving and design. Many NGOs and civil initiatives will likewise have to transform themselves to multi-stakeholder initiatives if they seek to initiate sustainable social change.

Running for the Hills: The Emergence of Social Design Initiatives versus Populism

Escaping from impending doom, we run for the nearest hills. Remarkably, it is the local contexts that provide the matrix and ground upon which cooperative social change emerges. The predominance of neoliberal market mechanisms over localised human concerns has already paralysed large parts of society. In the transition from Economy 3.0 to Economy 4.0, we ask questions such as:

Where can people with a medium income still find decent housing in big cities? How can children from lower socio-economic background participate in higher education? How can working parents find qualified care facilities for their children? How can people move socially upward by their honest effort and merit rather than by inheriting wealth? How can the segment of lower-skilled jobs be re-humanized? How can the entire population become enrolled in lifelong learning? How can people find meaning in their jobs and how can they find support in social networks and culture beyond their jobs? How can shared values evolve that benefit all members of society, not only a privileged few? How can local and regional economies switch to sustainable modes of production? How can inequality be diminished? How can countries reduce their national debt? How can cooperative change on a wide societal level be initiated? How can the poorest countries be woven into the vertical creation of wealth and turn into stable democratic societies?

To develop pragmatic solutions to such questions, Economy 4.0 requires grassroots social design initiatives that can respond more efficiently to local challenges as compared to traditional party politics. Much of the frustration and anger against ‘elites’ and traditional political parties stems from the inefficacy of public policy-making in addressing local concerns and issues, a weakness that populists keep exploiting. Populism obscures shared responsibilities by polarising the public view. Populism sanctions any actions by ‘us’ (the people) against ‘them’(the blamed elites) when in fact civil action ubiquitously requires adaptive political and legal frameworks in order for norms to take effect. In this light, populism evades the responsibility that people inherently share for each other.

In regressing to polarising group-mindsets that preceded the level of stakeholdership consensus, populists support the tragedy of the commons: if I can fully blame an external party for my group’s misery, I also abandon the shared ownership of the problem at hand by disconnecting systemic cause and effect. Finding scapegoats is always easier than managing integrative processes between people. The externalising and internalising psychology of populists resembles juvenile psychology which correlates with a diminished set of problem-solving skills.

Capital in the 21st Century and the Definition of Progress

Given the need for local social transformation, the future of complex societies lies not only in more socially-aware programs of political parties, but the grassroots empowerment of local communities to democratise the organisation of local administrations and businesses from within. An additional layer of social design initiatives is needed as a glue between the public sphere and traditional political parties. To demonstrate the efficacy of such integrating and transforming (multi-stakeholder) initiatives is one of our generation’s most pressing challenges.

Progress and prosperity do not come like a bolt of lightning from the top but depend on our personal initiative and ability to develop local contexts. Political frameworks will take on the new role to facilitate such initiatives, rather than fostering top-down social hierarchies guided by single-minded propositions. As many business models depend on taking advantage of disempowered groups, the question emerges how powerful exclusive groups can be motivated to change their modus operandi. This problem is even exacerbated when we consider spillover effects which are hard to quantify. While affluent nations consume most of the planetary resources and contribute to most of the per capita pollution, poorer nations pay the price by being subjected to foreign capital related corruption, floods, droughts and environmental degradation.

Image: Trash collectors in Cambodia. Picture credit Getty Images

Another limit to cooperative small-group social design initiatives lies in addressing large accumulations of capital as described in Piketty’s ‘Capital in the 21st Century’ which require being dealt with by political means. The philosophical and economic question is how super-wealthy elites monopolise resources at the expense of everybody else. As Piketty writes in his opus magnum “It is important to understand that a tax is always more than just a tax: it is also a way of defining norms and categories and imposing a legal framework on economic activity.” (Piketty 2014, p. 520). A normative understanding of socio-economic action that is based on people’s more tangible options for developing autonomy, supportive networks and competencies could replace the current model of Economy 3.0.

For the sake of maintaining the social contract, economic activity should serve the long-term ecological and socio-economic benefit of all, which defines the social-utilitarian aspect of Economy 4.0. The individual effort of activity needs to be rewarded and moderated in terms to how it proves to be of service to others, which describes the libertarian-meritocratic (client- and service-based) aspect of economic activity. As an example, recent discussions in Germany, where typical executive pay exceeds more than 50 times the salaries of ordinary workers, begs the question how excessive pay and bonuses are justified within a client-based context where elites should serve as a role model for the public good. How can people represent their group when they have disconnected themselves economically and socially from it in a significant manner and when they have widely abandoned sharing collective risks, liabilities and consequences? The international bailing out of failing banks by taxpayer’s money is a prominent example. Albert Bandura’s latest work on moral disengagement (Bandura, 2016), which investigates mechanisms of moral disassociation from systemic responsibilities, deserves to become a standard litmus test for monitoring corporate responsibility and accountability.

On the other hand, the oversimplified schemata of ‘capitalism versus socialism’ cannot regulate instances where the complexity of systems include multiple and competing types of nested social motivations. After all, consensus, by cooperation or by negotiation, implies legitimisation by internal audit (to serve ingroup fairness) as well as external responsibilities (to facilitate intergroup agreements). As we define the world differently with such an extended set of criteria to adjust to changed environmental conditions so changes our interpretation of progress. If we cannot make significant global progress happen within the next decades, nobody will.

Image below: G20 protesters in Hamburg, Germany

References

Anderson, K., & Kuhn, K. (2017).‘What the Health’ [documentary], A.U.M. Films & Media

Bandura, A. (2016). Moral disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves. New York, NY: Worth Publishers

Piketty, T., & Goldhammer, A. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Women in IT: Where are the disconnects?

cs-womenPicture credit: Harvey Mudd College

While the emerging knowledge- and service industries of the 21st-century is a continuing discussion topic of public discourse, the minuscule percentage of women embarking on careers in IT is deeply troubling. The IT industry struggles to find enough applicants to fill open positions as women are losing out on a personal and societal level by not embarking on beneficial career paths, effectively excluding themselves from Economy 4.0.

Problem Definition

Across Western cultures, very few women choose careers in IT. According to a recent study conducted by COMPTIA (2017), girl’s consideration of IT jobs wanes with age. While in Middle School 27% of girls still consider a career in IT, this number dwindles to a meagre 18% in High School. Only 7% of girls consider a career as a programmer (versus 25% of boys) and only 3% imagine a career as a software developer (versus 23% of boys). In Germany, only 17,4% of new job applications in IT are women according to a recent study ‘Recruiting Trends 2017’. Among the top 1000 IT companies in Germany, this number comes down to 13,2% of female applicants, constituting IT as a highly male-dominated industry.

The cited reasons for the low uptake are manifold. Early childhood socialisation favours boys to be associated with technology as compared to girls. As a result of this stereotypical expectation which is supported by many parents, boys are more encouraged to explore technology and science as compared to girls. Many women also feel uncomfortable to work as a minority in an already male-dominated field. In the social sphere, there are too few female role models available to guide and mentor younger girls. Many schools offer only rudimentary IT classes that do not inform and prepare students adequately for a future career. At the workplace, reports of unequal pay, unequal career development options and widespread gender bias within IT companies keep many women from joining. On top, very little useful information appears to be provided to young women about the diversity of careers in IT in general. We cannot dream about things that we don’t know about.

Although the general ‘acupuncture points‘ to why women do not take up jobs in IT have been identified in numerous international surveys, obstacles have not yet been specified by more thorough empirical research including validated models. What specifically keeps girls and women from embarking on careers in IT? How do factors interact? Can we draw inferences across cultural contexts? To dig deeper and go beyond generalised gender statements, we need to take a look at some of the leading theoretical frameworks in educational sociology and psychology.

Approaches in Educational Sociology

Raymond Boudon’s approach follows, as an external methodology, a rational choice approach based on an individual and situated cost-benefit calculus. In our case, young girls and their parents evaluate the costs, payoffs and likeliness of succeeding in careers in IT. The question is if and how young women from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds make different educational decisions after finishing school or college as compared to women from academic- and well-off families. The data gained from studies on the more fragile joints of education systems can inform interventions and communication strategies based on the attitudes and ways of life within a specific social milieu or class. Rational choice theories such as Boudon’s are good at examining the joints of educational trajectories such as transitions from secondary to tertiary and from tertiary to university- or polytechnic education.

Pierre Bourdieu’s Cultural Deprivation Theory, by comparison, looks at the ‘habitus‘, internalised patterns of socialisation, dispositions, daily routines and the in situ constitution of life-planning. His complementary concept of ‘doxa’ refers to the attempt of social members to bring subjective cognitive convictions into congruence with given (objective) social settings. In psychology, Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) deals with similar conflicts of cognitive non-congruence and scenarios where issues such as forced compliance behaviour, decision-making and effort play a central role. In our case, we are interested to find out how habitus and doxa affect the motivation of young women to engage in IT.

Psychological Approaches

Regarding observational learning and learning from social role models, Albert Bandura’s Social Learning Theory can inform our problem. What are the characteristics of role models in IT that inform and motivate young women? Which are the key predictors provided by role models for a behavioural engagement in IT?

As a motivational theory, Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012) offers a useful framework to identify the levels of personal autonomy, competencies and social relations in IT careers. As a motivational theory, SDT differentiates between extrinsic motivation (which is e.g., reward dependent) and intrinsic motivation which is self-sustaining. Analogously to Bourdieu’s notion of internalised life practice, it would be illuminating to examine to which extent life-planning, given a specific socioeconomic background, is constructed by more intrinsic or extrinsic types of motivation. There is an interesting conflict here: given that IT careers are based on the prerequisite of lifelong learning skills, an entirely extrinsic motivation orientation (e.g., a focus on above-average salaries and material benefits) that may prompt some women into taking up IT careers might not be the same motivation that is needed to sustain long-term growth within the field.

As in rational choice theories in sociology, we find similar approaches in psychology. Well-supported rational choice theories such as the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) examine attitudes towards planned behaviour, normative beliefs and perceived behavioural control analogous to Boudon’s framework. The theory’s assumption is that actors make rational, individual decisions in favour of personal benefit and estimate their chances at achieving payoffs.

Badura’s Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 2002) focusses, by contrast, on the social context at hand and it researches the interplay between social modelling (such as by role-models and tutors), individual outcome expectations and the development of Self-Efficacy. The relevance of the latter for women’s interest in IT has been confirmed by previous studies. Social Cognitive Theory and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) may also explain how the discrimination of women in IT, as illustrated by a recent example of open gender discrimination at Google, (a ten-page manifesto, by a software engineer, circulated internally and ranting against women’s capability in IT) discourages women to take up technology jobs. Why should women work in an environment psychologically hostile to them, objectively pays women less than men and progresses men faster than women in their careers, as claimed by many Google employees? Social Identity Theory can explain stereotype formation by the subsequent processes of social categorization (such as gender-based categorization), social identification (such as traits identified as distinctively male or female) and social comparison (such as concluding males more capable than women).

Strong Empirical Support

There appears to be solid empirical support for Cultural Deprivation Theory as well as the cited psychological theories, especially SDT and Social Cognitive Theory. Boys have earlier profound computer experiences, such as e.g., through computer games (Oosterwegel, Littleton, & Light, 2004) and display a more autonomous acquisition of technology as compared to girls. Fathers are reported to be stronger roles models for both male and female students (Turner et al., 2002). Girls tend to rate their computer skills generally far lower than boys (Young, 2000; McCoy & Heafner, 2004). Girls attend fewer computer classes and display lower self-confidence in the use of computers (Beyer et al., 2002; Durndell & Haag, 2002; Lee, 2003). Regarding the cultural value underlying IT, women in Applied IT “rated helping others as an important reason for choosing an IT major more often than did any other group.” (Organ et al., 2005, pg.20), suggesting a different set of underlying motivations for engaging in IT as compared to boys. Most of the recent studies such as COMPTIA (2017) and ‘Recruiting Trends 2017’ confirm findings of these earlier studies.

Graphic: Top Barriers identified by ISACA Study (2016). Workplace disadvantages have a significant negative correlation to IT enrollment by women. 

Defining the Acupuncture Points for Potential Studies

From a psychological perspective, there are at least three areas of interest that we could preliminarily define as a 3-factor model, following Bandura’s Triadic reciprocal causation model, consisting of the independent variables of  (a) social predictors, (b) workplace predictors and (c) intrapersonal predictors on the dependent variable of women to enroll in IT careers. As we know from the studies cited above, all of these factors influence women’s motivation to enrol in IT jobs. Under factor (a) items of interest are measures such as the availability of female mentors, female role models, early childhood socialisation towards technology and social milieu. Under factor (b) fall items such as gender bias/ gender fairness in the workplace, the perception of equal growth opportunities, equal pay as well as the prospect to work with other women and not only men. Under factor (c) items of interest might be tried-and-tested psychological variables such as the prevalence of traditional gender role beliefs, goal orientation (extrinsic versus intrinsic goal-orientation), control beliefs and attitudes towards IT. A working hypothesis as the basis for an Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis is sketched out below (Fig.1)

SEM Concept

Figure 1: The supervening working hypothesis for the factors predicting women’s enrollment in IT. We assume that social scaffolding, workplace support and intrapersonal competencies have an equal influence on women enrolling in IT jobs. Factor loadings of items would reveal in greater detail the more significant predictors.

More informative, from a social psychology perspective, would be multi group comparisons, e.g. between male and female students prior to applying for IT jobs (Study Design Option I – Differences between male and female profiles predicting engagement in IT careers) or between undecided female students and young women who have already embarked on a career in IT (Study Design Option II – Differences between female IT professionals and average female student population: Which factors predict enrollment in IT ?) in order to gain deeper insights on the most significant factors that keep women from joining careers in IT.

Another unresolved issue is if and how IT has been influenced by predominantly male concepts and values (Study Design Option III – Relation between IT, male constructs and values: Are IT constructs excluding female values and perspectives?). For example, current enrollment data suggests that women are more attracted to IT jobs that involve the motif of caring such as in biomedical research, environmental- or socioeconomic development. Which cultural values does IT represent and how is it related to gender constructs? Has IT been conceptualized, as suggested by Clegg (2001), as an obsessively masculine construct that lacks appeal to women? Ideological gender constructs of computing technology are no trivial matter. Clegg points out that most action-packed and competitive games have been designed and marketed by men for men. Computing has been widely associated in public discourse and media with military technology, cyber warriors and a competitive display of power – a technological machismo that few women find appealing and are able to identify with. Women, by contrast, have been marginalized in IT as secretaries, low-paid administerial workers or staff in online call-centers. New domains, such as in computerised lifelong learning, however, may offer a more fitting identification for many women.

Lastly, retaining female IT personnel and offering women long-term prospects in IT would be another relevant area of research (Study Design Option IV: How can employers retain female IT staff?). The outcomes of gender-based IT studies are useful for designing more efficient information campaigns, communication strategies, e-platforms, school- and college-initiatives as well as developing institutional policies for employers to motivate young women to join IT-related careers.

Conclusion

As Economy 4.0 embraces collaboration and cooperation, it opens the female notion of caring which appeared as a strong motif in all of the studies. From a caring female perspective, IT can be reformulated as a means to re-establish our connections to nature, to others and our future potentials. It is not so much that women have an issue with IT, but that IT has been widely cultivated and advertised as a predominantly male domain. New developments such as in online learning, computer science or AI development offer new role identification opportunities for young women.

The illustrated working hypothesis suggests that multiple factors predict the involvement of women in IT rather than a single argument. In addition, media images and stereotype clichées of the lonely nerd or socially deprived hacker are not helpful to any gender since IT relies heavily on the ability to work in teams. Instead, it would be more productive to develop cooperative spaces within IT where gender domination does not obscure the love for creating technology that is beneficial to all.

 

References

Ajzen, I. (1991). “The theory of planned behavior”. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 50 (2): 179–211.

Bandura, A. (2002). Social cognitive theory of mass communication. In J. Bryant & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research (pp. 94-124). New York, NY: Routledge.

Beyer, S., Chavez, M., and Rynes, K. (2002, May). Gender differences in attitudes
toward and confidence in computer science. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.

Clegg, S. (2001). Theorising the machine: Gender, education and computing. Gender and
Education, 13, 307-324.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2012). Motivation, personality, and development within embedded social contexts: An overview of self-determination theory. In R. M. Ryan (Ed.), Oxford handbook of human motivation (pp. 85-107). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Durndell, A., and Haag, Z. (2002). Computer self-efficacy, computer anxiety, attitudes
towards the internet and reported experience with the Internet, by gender, in an
East European sample. Computers in Human Behavior, 18, 521-535.

McCoy, L.P., and Heafner, T.L. (2004). Effect of gender on computer use and attitudes of
college seniors. Journal of Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering,
10, 55-66

Lee, A.C.K. (2003). Undergraduate students’ gender differences in IT skills and attitudes.
Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 19, 488-500.

Ogan, C., Herringg, S., Robinson, J.C. & Ahuya M. (2005). The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Gender Differences in Attitudes and Experiences Related to Computing Among Students in Computer Science and Applied Information
Technology Programs. Paper presented at the 2005 International Communication Association Conference, New York, NY

Oosterwegel, A., Littleton, K., and Light, P. (2004). Understanding computer-related
attitudes through an idiographic analysis of gender- and self-representations.
Learning and Instruction, 14, 215-233.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The social psychology of intergroup relations?, 33, 47.

Turner, S.V., Bernt, P.W., and Pecora, N. (2002, April). Why women choose information
technology careers: Educational, social, and familial influences. Paper presented
at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New
Orleans, LA.

Young, B.J. (2000). Gender differences in student attitudes toward computers. Journal of
Research on Computing in Education, 33, 204-216.

How Unregulated For-Profits Degrade Higher Education: The Case of Raffles Education Corporation

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The picture above: The Raffles Campus in Bangna, Bangkok. Nice to look at, but where are the students? After losing the TEQSA accreditation, the student population dropped from about 340 at the Silom Campus to about 70 after moving to the Bangna Campus.

Short Introduction to the Long Read: The Commercial and Academic Failure of Unregulated For-profit Education

The following is a summary of my experiences that I made in over a decade with Raffles Education Corporation. The presented argument states that for-profit providers who turn education into a mere money-making business are unable to educate young people to a satisfactory standard. Education requires knowledge, skills and mindsets that commercial entities are not able to provide. The value proposition of Raffles Education Corporation is derived from its current affiliated partners, such as the University of Northumbria who does provide quality education. In the US, similar enterprises can be found operating on the same business model (such as e.g., Apollo Education, EDMC, DeVry, CEC, Corinthian Colleges Inc., Kaplan or Bridgepoint, to name a few) which is why the following analysis is framed as a systemic case study. Due to their rather rogue modes of operation, unregulated for-profits pose an international problem.

For example, to the knowledge of the author, Raffles Bangkok failed to set up proper academic committees as required by the Thai Ministry of Education to advance their final college license. Master programs are already planned without a university license while none of the current staff is qualified at a doctoral level. International students cannot be provided with Thai visas and so the list goes on.

In terms of total student numbers, this is not a large company. Officially, Raffles cites on its website a total of 15,000 students across 25 international campuses, making it on the average 600 students per campus on paper. Knowing how Raffles tends to inflate numbers, I would not be surprised if there are no more than half of those students still studying with the company, perhaps far less. Even if one believes the official count, the entire student population across the Raffles network would be equivalent to an average polytechnic or university but spread out over 23 countries. This is not much by a large margin. Calling itself the ‘prime’ private education provider in SE-Asia gives the wrong impression that this is a large enterprise. Measured in overall market size, Raffles is not a significant market player in Asia’s educational landscape. Laureate Education as another private education provider, by comparison, claims about at least 80,000 students for the Asia Pacific region with a mix of for-profit and non-profit institutions such as Stamford University in Bangkok. On an international level, Laureate has received mixed reviews for putting marketing hype ahead of quality education, similar to Raffles.

Run top-down in an autocratic manner by its CEO, Raffles has never been a progressive and innovative company from its beginnings. Demanding high tuition fees while cutting down on anything that remotely incurs costs to improve the quality of education has led to a continuous deterioration of the stock-listed company which continues generating net losses. Many students and their parents have started to see beyond the blown-up advertising slogans promoted in glossy brochures.

The concluding message is that a neoliberal approach to education has failed as a pedagogical concept as well as an economic model. For now, the following account serves the purpose of learning from the mistakes that Raffles Education Corporation has cultivated over the past two decades. The company’s narrative elucidates the discrepancy between a naïve commercialism of making quick money from students by putting together a rudimentary infrastructure versus the demanding task to provide evidence-based quality education.

A PDF of this entry can be found here Raffles Case Study 2017

The official court verdict of the Federal Court of Australia that decided Raffles losing their accreditation is available here federal-court2015fca0734

The Australian Universities Quality Agency 2009 audit that highlights the systemic issues of Raffles can be downloaded here Report of an Audit of Raffles College of Design and Commerce

Prologue

How the cookie crumbled

I joined Raffles Education Corporation in 2005 after a productive decade serving at Temasek Polytechnic in Singapore. The first year I worked as Senior Lecturer in the Visual Communication department at the Raffles Shanghai branch (Dong Hua University/ Raffles-LaSalle) before being promoted to Program Director for Multimedia Design (and later also Visual Communication) at the Silom Road Campus in Bangkok.

Five years later, rumours surfaced that Raffles had not obtained a proper legal license to operate in Thailand, an accusation that proved to be true. In the local newspapers, Raffles was quoted as a rogue education provider offering international programs that it had no adequate permit to deliver. As the threat of foreclosure became imminent in 2010, Raffles committed to building a campus in Bangna to appease the government and to indicate that the company would play by the rules from now on.

In June 2015, another scandal hit Raffles. The entire network, via the Raffles College of Design and Commerce in Australia (RDCD), lost its accreditation granted by the Australian government for undergraduate programs for not delivering education of satisfactory standard. More than 1000 students across Asia ended up stranded and were forced to either complete their studies at branches in other countries or to cut losses by discontinuing their education with Raffles. Closures of branches across Asia started to become more frequent. At the time, I was still completing my Masters in Applied Psychology with the University of Liverpool. After I graduated in December 2016, I left Raffles in February 2017 in mutually amicable agreement as I dissented with the company’s business ethics and educational standards or lack thereof. This is the story of an unregulated and deeply dysfunctional education provider.

This following document is written in gratitude to all of my students who put up with the inadequacies of the company during their studies. Despite the institutional shortcomings we all faced, I deeply value our learning journeys. This summary is also written in appreciation of my ex-colleagues who have been through their share of professional frustrations. In order to gain a more objective perspective, policies and regulations at Temasek Polytechnic in Singapore are compared to corresponding frameworks at Raffles, setting the stage for directly comparing unregulated private education with regulated government education.

Joana Stella Kompa, June 2017

 

Chapter 1

Who teaches the teachers?

Were all instructors to realise that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked.

John Dewey, Democracy and Education

A good starting point to assess the quality of an institution of Higher Learning is to probe the qualification of its teachers. How can schools, polytechnics, colleges or universities function without competent staff; not only competent in their field but also competent as educators and mentors of young people?

Temasek set up a dual strategy for teacher training. The first strategy was to offer a general two-year pedagogical certification program for academic staff conducted by SEDA, the Staff and Educational Development Association in the UK. At the end of the two-year program, staff obtained an international ‘Teacher in Higher Education’ accreditation. In essence, academic staff had to compile an evidence-based teaching portfolio ranging from applying pedagogical objectives in classroom settings to creating new programs that align with SEDA’s core values. These values entailed understanding how students learn, demonstrating concern for students’ development, commitment to scholarship, cooperation with colleagues, practising equal opportunities and ongoing reflection on professional practice.

The second pillar at Temasek was the further specialisation in active learning, student-centred pedagogy. In the case of Temasek, Problem-based Learning (PBL) was implemented across all faculties as a student-oriented pedagogy about 15 years ago. My task as Associate Consultant for PBL to Temasek Design School was the training of staff and students while managing the implementation of PBL for Temasek Design School.

At Raffles, by comparison, staff pedagogical training and development is non-existent. There are no qualification programs available of any kind to develop and improve even basic teaching skills. Typically, the staff is recruited from the industry with a Bachelor or Master’s degree which is regarded as sufficient for employment. Raffles leaves the issue of teacher qualification unregulated, most likely since pedagogical training poses a significant cost factor. This neglect does not stay without consequences.

The deregulation of pedagogical standards encourages academic staff to replicate their personal teaching styles which lead to a predominantly instruction-based program delivery based on rote learning. Teachers tend to replicate same learning conditions under which they have learnt themselves. In such settings less capable staff, especially a large number of untrained part-time teachers fails across categories. Many teachers are incapable of basic classroom management. Some teach the wrong subjects or modules, tell students the answers to multiple-choice exam questions in advance, copy materials from the Internet or fill classroom time with nauseating PowerPoint presentations or YouTube videos.  These counterproductive practices are amplified by Raffles demanding four-hour teaching blocks, tempting teachers to fill time with superfluous activities. There is no regular student that I know who could pay attention for a continued four hours. Pedagogically absurd concepts such as the four-hour teaching blocks are however religiously enforced to accumulate, on paper, stipulated subject hours.

Once Raffles’ untrained teachers enter the classroom they occupy their private kingdom. An evidence-based, peer-reviewed process of measuring the progress of students’ learning is not implemented. Teachers are asked pro forma to provide formative feedback to students but then again, no staff has ever been trained on how to structure and conduct efficient formative feedback. How can students possibly improve when all they receive is feedback of a teacher’s personal commentary? On a corporate scale, why would a franchise network consisting of 26 colleges with fluctuating staff turnover be interested investing in long-term pedagogical staff development?

Another example for teacher-centeredness is regularly conducted teacher course evaluations (so-called ‘TEVALs’) which are handed to students each term to assess the performance of their lecturers. Out of 20 questions to students, 12 relate directly and exclusively to lecturer evaluation. Only six questions relate to assessing the subject and not a single question refers to the different roles of students as learners.

In theory, as in practice, Raffles is a teacher-centred institution. It cares very little about students’ development, be it on an individual or social level. Pedagogy is treated as an unnecessary cost factor while teachers blindly assume that their natural gift for teaching is sufficient to prepare students for the knowledge- and service society of the 21st century. The real problem is that it is irrelevant what a teacher teaches, but it is critical what a student has learnt. But how can teachers track students’ ongoing progress in the absence of structured and mandatory assessment procedures?

Chapter 2

The Raffles Curriculum: Jack-Of-All-Trades, Master of None

‘Franchised Arrangements: Where an offshore entity delivers a regulated course on behalf of a provider under license. (…) This model is likely to be higher risk as the provider does not contribute to the delivery of the course and has less control over the quality.’

Australian Government/ TEQSA Report on RCDC, October 2014

Besides a qualified staff, curricula are of the essence. The quality of offered programs is the very backbone of any institution of Higher Learning.

Curricula at Temasek were, as in most progressive government institutions, subject to critical review and improvement based on the feedback from students, academic staff, senior lecturers, program directors and PBL consultants. It is only by a comprehensive cooperative review that curricula can be successfully updated and improved. Changes affect particularly learning outcomes. New developments in technology and socio-economic contexts require a continuous updating of subject outcomes in order to remain valid and relevant. Secondly, curricula should not only offer solid foundation studies but beyond basics they should allow students to achieve mastery, achieving a professional standard in their field.

The origins of the Raffles Advanced Diploma curricula go back to the 1990s when Raffles started business operations in partnership with the Canadian LaSalle College of the Arts and Design. Some parts of the curricula were designed ad hoc by available academic staff and their peers. Since then, Raffles University System (RUS) is the sole guardian of the curricula as it centrally disseminates the programs to all of Raffles’ branches as a franchise. Unlike Temasek, no feedback or data is gathered from students, staff or Program Directors to improve the 25-year-old curricula. Instead, a small expert group at RUS takes care of updating the programs. Such contained routine has multiple ramifications.

On a subject level, even the most prolific experts cannot be specialists at everything leaving the content of many subjects outdated and obsolete. For example, Raffles multimedia students still learn Adobe Flash although Flash stopped being used on the web for many years due to its massive vulnerabilities. New critical skills such as developing mobile applications have never entered the Raffles curriculum. More demanding skills such as advanced scripting and coding have never become part of multimedia programs, arguably because students with lesser aptitude would be overwhelmed. The culture of compiling ‘softball subjects’ affects lecturers as well. For motivated lecturers, the teaching of Raffles’ curricula can turn into a rather dull affair since they are not allowed to make sensible improvements that would change standardised learning outcomes, assessment, and assessment criteria. Instead, all that is required by lecturers is to deliver uniform packages, a practice that can be demotivating for staff whose professional qualifications supersede those of the curricula-guardians at RUS. No data and information are collected to find out how stipulated learning outcomes fare in the current context of industry and academia. The underlying blind assumption is that the recommendations of the RUS expert group are reliable, scalable and suffice as a benchmark.

Outdated content is not the only problem. The delivery of standard packages within the franchise system renders a lecturer’s qualification largely irrelevant: A young and inexperienced lecturer with barely a Bachelor under her arm qualifies equally well to teach diploma subjects as compared to a senior and highly experienced professional on a graduate level. From the perspective of delivering standardised syllabi, high staff qualification is of secondary interest. The less specialised the syllabus, the easier employees can be substituted.

In order to understand the reasons behind the limited specialisation of study paths on program level one has to keep in mind that Raffles is a commercial entity. The profit formula of the company dictates that a maximum number of students are taught by a minimum number of lecturers resulting in a limited number of subjects on offer. This also results in lecturers teaching 6-7 subjects (courses) per term, so between 24-28 teaching hours. The upper limit in most regular, non-research based universities is about four courses.

The multimedia curriculum at Raffles, for example, contains mixed sets for video production (3 subjects), animation (2 subjects), web-technologies (3 subjects) and interactive media (3 subjects) offering basic introductions to various aspects of multimedia, but not advancing into any area in depth. Let’s assume a student intends to study filmmaking. At Raffles, this student would cover the subjects ‘Storyboarding’, ‘Video and Audio Editing’ as well as ‘Experimental Video’, which are three subjects in total.  A student on diploma level at Temasek, by comparison, finishes 21 core subjects in video production (plus 9 electives). A student of ‘3D Interactive Media’ at Temasek enjoys 23 specialised core subjects (plus 5 electives) while a student at Raffles covers in the same field a mere six subjects relating to 3D animation and interactive environments.

The lack of specialising subjects is easily explained. Although Raffles operates a wide network of campuses across Asia, student numbers for each campus are typically small which renders the employment of large numbers of staff uneconomic. This is also one of the reasons why highly specialised for-profit education providers such as, e.g., Full Sail University in the U.S. rely on a centralised campus with a large student population. Only with a larger pool of academic staff, it is possible to offer a wider array of specialised subjects. The paucity of subject specialisation at Raffles, particularly in the second year of studies, stands in stark contrast to its marketing promise of achieving career excellence.

Where in public institutions of Higher Learning well-staffed faculties create vivid communities of scholar-practitioners, lecturers at Raffles carve out an uninspiring solitary existence. Alone or with very few colleagues there is little incentive for them to create new exciting programs since syllabi are cast in stone. To this extent, the Raffles franchise model kills innovation in education.

The tale of an unsustainable business model

Company development on the stock market: After the crash of the global stock market in 2008, net profits declined correspondingly with a diminishing student population across the Raffles network. Most money was made during the short and rapid expansion based on the opening of new branches between 2006-2008.

Detailed view: Continuing losses after 2011

Chapter 3

The Achilles Heel of Government Licensing

‘(21) In the event that TEQSA made a recommendation under section 9AA for RCDC’s registration to be renewed, the Secretary would need to have no reason to believe that RCDC (…) does not have the clearly demonstrated capacity to provide education of a satisfactory standard; or (…) is unlikely to be able to provide education of a satisfactory standard.’

‘(32) It is implicit in that observation that I reject the submission that the defaults identified by TEQSA were only record-keeping matters. In my opinion that understates the significance of many of them, particularly the ones concerned with the ability of the students to speak English at an adequate level.’

From Court Verdict Raffles College Pty Ltd v Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency [2015] FCA 734 of 20th July 2015

Taking it Easy with Licensing and Working Around It

The Achilles heel for all private education providers is official accreditation and licensing. In December 2016, Raffles obtained government approval to set up a Private Higher Education Institution, pending government conditions, after operating without a valid permit since 2003 when the company started as ‘Raffles Design Institute’ on Silom Road. Apparently, Raffles was only licensed as a tutorial centre. It had neither obtained a vocational nor a college license to legally operate in Thailand. Raffles Design Institute was licensed to provide one-year short courses while the official RUS Advanced Diploma program was set out as a two-year program. Raffles’ solution to enrol students was simple: student visas for foreign students would be renewed annually. On paper, a student would e.g., study Graphic Design in the first year and Interior Design in the second etc., a convenient workaround to official regulations to run the full RUS diploma program.

Providing Misleading Information to the Press: Smokescreen Tactics

In 2010, the Ministry of Education found out about Raffles flying under the radar of the law and threatened to close down operations. A deal was struck and Raffles committed to building a proper campus in Bangna on the outskirts of Bangkok as a prerequisite to qualifying as a Higher Education Provider. Forbes magazine mentioned the pending shutdown in one of his articles but the CEO of Raffles, Mr Chew Hua Seng, demanded from Forbes magazine to publish a correction. In his letter to Forbes on 2nd of August 2010, Mr. Chew Hua Seng claimed that “Raffles Education Corp is working closely with Thailand’s Higher Education Commission to comply with its requirement for RBK to acquire a university permit in addition to the vocational education license it had obtained in 2003 when it started operations in Bangkok.” Factually, Raffles had never obtained a vocational license. It was only in April 2016, six years later, that Raffles attempted to secure a proper vocational license by negotiating with the Ministry of Education – an idea Raffles later abandoned in favour of aiming at a Higher Education license. Needless to say, Raffles never acquired a university permit either and was at no stage qualified to apply for one.

Smokescreen Tactics in Other Countries: The Example of Raffles Colombo

In December 2016, the Thai Ministry of Education granted Raffles the license to set up a college, pending conforming requirements. Although it seems like good news that Raffles Bangkok appears finally on its way towards becoming a legitimate education provider, similar reports of starting operations under the radar of the law surfaced in other countries. In October 2015, Raffles in Colombo, Sri Lanka was accused in ‘The Sunday Leader’ of June 16, 2013, in the article ‘Raffles Colombo Misleading Students’ of deceiving students by pretending that it had obtained government licensing for its diploma programs when in fact licensing had not substantialized yet. Raffles went ahead advertising its programs while government approval was still pending.

In their rebuttal to the article, Raffles made some misleading statements. It claimed that the company was ‘granted in-principle approval’ from the government which is not identical to obtaining final approval. The original Sunday Leader article, written by Nirmala Kannangara, was attacked by Raffles accusing her of ‘malicious intent (…) calculated to ridicule and injure the reputation of Raffles Education Corporation Ltd.’ Based on the aggressive response, one cannot evade the impression that the author may have hit a nerve.

The rebuttal further stated, “The truth is Raffles is not banned in Thailand and in fact, we are in the process of being upgraded to university college status by the Thai authorities.” It is true that Raffles was never banned in Thailand, but one may add the light fact that it ran 13 years illegally without a valid permit. The fine print in the Raffles rebuttal used the term ‘in the process’, a standard smokescreen description employed by Raffles to buy time, evade factual scrutiny and formulate pre-emptive strikes: How dare you to accuse us when we are in the process of becoming legitimate? The term ‘university college’ used in the rebuttal was misleading as the pending Thai license is de facto only a college license. Besides, in the UK, the title ‘university college’ is protected by law and requires authorization by an act of parliament which is why Raffles should perhaps avoid the term altogether, in particular when cooperating with UK universities. The fact that Raffles started advertising Masters programs from Coventry University without a university license suggests that it blatantly continues to violate the law.

Chapter 4

How the Raffles Franchise Model Affects Students

Any student with a credit card and a wallet can enrol at Raffles.” Former College Director

The Loss of Accreditation affecting all Raffles Branches

The Raffles franchise model affects students on a socio-economic, educational and psychological level. Since Raffles is a for-profit corporation, it reserves its right to open and close branches as the economic situation dictates, with little regard for students and parents.

In its short history, Raffles has closed branches in Chandigarh, Kolkata, Dhaka, Bangalore, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Manila, leaving students stranded or forcing them to relocate and continue their studies at other branches of Raffles. In June 2015, Raffles College of Design and Commerce (RCDC) in Australia lost its accreditation with TEQSA (Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency), an independent statutory authority within the Australian Government, for not complying with requirements of the Higher Education Standards Framework. During legal proceedings, Raffles appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to have its name suppressed, a request that was denied by the court. In its verdict, the Federal Court in Australia attested RCDC that is ‘does not have the clearly demonstrated capacity to provide education of a satisfactory standard’. The Honorary Judge Perram particularly criticised the lack of students’ English language proficiency. Subsequently, more than a 1000 students from campuses at Bangalore, Bangkok, Colombo, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Kula Lumpur, Mumbai, New Delhi, Shanghai, Singapore, and Ulanbataar were affected. Agreements were made to ‘teach out’ TEQSA’s undergraduate programs at selected campuses in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Colombo in order to provide an exit for stranded students who only had few subjects to complete.

For those students who were not able to take this exit, choosing Raffles translated into wasted time and financial resources for students and their parents. Most government agencies in SE-Asia lack legal frameworks for ensuring consumer protection to hold private education providers such as Raffles accountable for disastrous mismanagement. Due to the loss of accreditation, the student population in Bangkok diminished from approximately 340 to about 70 shortly after the college moved to its new campus in Bangna. Subsequently, classes shrank to only a few students per class. Since subject delivery works in four-hour blocks, in a worst-case scenario a single student would be taught by a lecturer for a full four hours. Needless to say, that this is neither an enjoyable experience for the student nor a sensible pedagogical proposition. By replacing the lost accreditation of TEQSA by a new partnership with the University of Northumbria, Raffles hopes to restore its student population.

Educational Consequences

The psychological and pedagogical consequences for students at Raffles are manifold and start with enrollment policies. As a former College Director at Raffles eloquently put it, “Everyone with a wallet and a credit card can enrol at Raffles”. To enrol, prospective students neither face aptitude tests nor qualification interviews or portfolio reviews. Due to limited numbers of new applicants, everybody qualifies. Language standards are likewise lax. On the Raffles Bangkok website (as per 23/4/2017) it was stated that an IELTS level of 5.0 is regarded as sufficient. Band 5 in IELTS officially signifies ‘modest’ language proficiency, meaning that the student can communicate in most situations but may struggle in an academic environment. An IELTS score of 5.0 is therefore in no way adequate when aiming for an undergraduate degree (standard is IELTS 6.0 or 6.5) with an affiliated partner university. Little seems learned from previous failures.

The unregulated intake of students also translates into unbalanced student distributions, resembling an inverted Bell curve. Highly qualified students share the same classroom with students of low aptitude, compromised cognitive abilities and low motivation making it difficult for teaching staff to cater to both groups. Motivated students tend to feel that they underperform in class while challenged students still struggle with regular assignments or skip classes. Failing by attendance numbers are unusually high. Since a common ground for over- and underperforming students is difficult to establish in absence of any pedagogical strategy, students’ overall learning remains suboptimal. Occasionally, I was lucky to coach a small group of talented and motivated students, which allowed establishing a more motivating and successful level of studies. Such instances, unfortunately, were the exemption of the rule.

Lastly, for many private students, commercial education is synonymous with the entitlement to a degree. As paying customers, students feel entitled to pass even when putting minimal effort into their studies. They feel entitled to receive extra services such as favourable treatment when it comes to non-attendance of classes, the extension of deadlines, turning a blind eye on plagiarism or better grades from their lecturers. Pleasing few paying customers (that maintain the business) puts academics and management in a compromising situation. The same is true for admissions: Turning down students with low aptitude translates directly into losing paying customers. The conflict of interest between keeping students and upholding standards is obvious.

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TEQSA Report 2014: One of the last external audits reveals a lack of implemented quality assurance policies (“But much work is necessary to further develop and implement the [quality assurance] system across RCDC and its transnational delivery sites”). If Raffles was a young start-up still catching up to fulfil official regulations this would be a different story, but the company has been in the business for the past 25 years.

Chapter 5

From Distinguished Academics to a Service-providing Precariat: The Degradation of Academics in Commercial Education

‘At RCDC there is little evidence of systems to support the academic committees. (…) AQUA (…) advises the College to increase its efforts to ensure the implementation and regular monitoring of quality assurance policies and their practical application at all levels of the College.’

Australian Government/ TEQSA Report on RCDC, October 2014

From the perspective of academic staff, Temasek and Raffles represent two entirely different worlds. Temasek invested heavily in staff professional development, encouraged motivated staff to take on extended responsibilities while the institution rewarded efforts via salary increments and bonuses. For example, I was supported to speak at international conferences and was provided overseas training to develop educational competencies. As my employer, Temasek also paid into a retirement fund, the CPF (Central Provident Fund) contributing to my social security.

Regarding the importance of professional development, a former superior of mine at Temasek made perhaps the most important comment: “As a lecturer and working in education for many years, you will lose your market value gradually. You are no more in competition with your peers in the industry. This is why it is our responsibility to upgrade your skill level to a point where you are on par, at least approximately, with industry should you ever decide to return. We owe you that much.”

At Raffles, it is the absence of benefits and professional staff development that defines general working conditions. Since most staff is recruited from non-academic backgrounds, benefits such as academic research activities or participating at international conferences are not supported. Staff members that need to upgrade to a Masters or postgraduate level will have to do so at their own expense, creating hidden costs of employment for academics. Offering a poor two weeks of annual leave, Raffles clearly follows standards of the corporate but not the academic world. In the absence of accredited professional training, there is no official categorization system in place to distinguish junior from senior staff and subsequently no corresponding progressive salary structure.

Looking at staff benefits and rewards, the outlook is equally bleak. Raffles offers no performance bonuses or a year-end bonus. When I joined the company, I was assured that bonuses would be paid in lieu by staff stock options since Raffles is a publicly listed company on the Singapore Exchange. However, since Raffles stock steadily declined after the global financial crisis in 2008 to less than a tenth of its peak value, stock options have become redundant.

Unlike academic careers in the government sector, careers at Raffles are limited based on the following grounds:

  1. The lack of professional development to build competencies and a decent portfolio
  2. The lack of bonuses and incentives for good performance
  3. The restriction of employment to fixed contracts that can be terminated at any time
  4. The narrow task of delivering pre-packaged curricula without active participation in their design, which creates a rather passive working environment based on mere compliance
  5. The absence of academic activities and scholarship such as support for research, publications or attending international conferences
  6. The limitation to only two weeks of earned annual leave based on standards for commercial organisations but not academia

Lecturers are told that they need to compile their own teaching materials on an individual account. No workgroups or processes are in place to formally review and update those materials.

Subsequently, academics in the commercial sector degrade to a lowly qualified precariat. The trajectories of academic careers are tied closely to the commercial success of the company to which no long-term guarantees can be given. For this reason, distinguished academics from reputable colleges and universities will find little appeal in joining companies such as Raffles.

In the marketing speak of Raffles, the lack of pedagogical requirements for staff is advertised as ‘Our educators are more than teachers. They are creative practitioners and experts in their own professions. ‘ (studyatraffles.com, 2017). There is no such thing as ‘more than’ teachers. It rather appears that Raffles never bothered to take up the intellectual challenge to look at internationally established professional standards of teacher qualifications and applying them to their business.

Chart: Comparison with other private education providers

Chapter 6

The Learning Environment

‘The independent expert report provided under paragraph b of this condition expressed concern about the functionality and adequacy of resourcing of the libraries in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur. While TEQSA considered further information provided by RCDC, TEQSA remained of the view that RCDC is at risk of not complying with the PCAS in respect of:

  • PCAS 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 relating to the adequacy of course resourcing and of access to library and information services, and to the adequacy of IT resources; and
  • PCAS 1.9 in respect of the courses ensuring equivalent student learning outcomes regardless of a student’s place or mode of study’

Australian Government/ Report on imposing conditions on the accreditation of two higher education courses offered by Raffles College Pty Ltd (t/a Raffles College of Design and Commerce (“RCDC”), 9 June 2016.

In more than a decade of service, beyond minimalist coverage, I have not yet seen any substantial equipment purchase required for students’ studies. Although on paper Raffles does have a recommended equipment list, our multimedia students were never provided video editing suites, audio equipment, broadcast-level digital cameras or related software that would qualify as a sufficiently well-equipped learning environment. Due to the lack of equipment, students eventually had to bring their own cameras, had to improvise with inferior equipment such as Sony Handycams or record audio using their mobile phones instead of professional audio recorders. As a result, student work always lacked the polish as compared to productions from other institutions that use industry-grade equipment. Essentially, the new campus at Bangna has been an empty shell since its opening.

All that students could hope for was to produce passable, but improvised low-resolution pieces that have little in common with the ‘sparkling diamonds’ promised in the Raffles marketing brochures. Nevertheless, why would a company invest in costly equipment when it is used in only a few subjects and for a limited number of students? Some of my alumni who felt pity for the poor choice of equipment available to our multimedia students offered their high-end professional equipment to come to the rescue. As a Program Director and their former lecturer, I felt both thankful and embarrassed. The dire lack of equipment and studios was no different when I worked at Raffles in Shanghai or when looking across departments. Until today, the product design department in Bangkok e.g., has no 3D-printers. The visual design department still lacks basics such as professional font libraries, binding equipment, laser cutting machines or silkscreen printing facilities. For academic work, students do not have access to digital libraries (and no up-to-date analogue library either) while the few functioning classroom computers still ran on Windows XP, as per March 2017, unable to run the latest versions of required Adobe software. The commanding of high tuition fees stands in no relation to the deplorable state of the learning environment. It appears, contrary to its public image as a prestigious education provider, that the Raffles network might be simply running low on funds. Many issues relating to the learning environment go beyond facilities.

From 2006 to 2017, Raffles Bangkok employed a total of seven College Directors (the position of Academic Directors was abandoned for all colleges below 500 students in 2014), each with a different personal agenda on student support, such as promoting or abandoning English language programs, which effectively prohibited a consistent educational policy. The high rate of part-time teachers likewise does not allow for a consistent and controlled delivery of subjects.

Are all private education providers bad apples?

Raffles is an extreme case of an unregulated for-profit education provider that has managed for many years to fly under the radar of government regulations and public scrutiny.

For-profit providers do not categorically provide an inferior education. Numerous private education providers open their institutions to regular independent quality audits, such as e.g. Stamford University in Bangkok under LAUREATE Education, and have established a sensible academic culture.

In Germany, as another example, all private schools have to conduct standardised government exams and adhere to federal policies – the reason why many private schools and colleges are government funded and charge little or no tuition. This is a very different approach as compared to entirely corporate providers. The objective in Germany is to offer parents different pedagogical approaches such as, e.g., Montessori, ‘Club of Rome’ or ‘Jenaplan’ schools that advocate global responsibility, social context immersion, social inclusion and democracy, higher goals that are not even on the radar of Raffles Education Corporation.

Many private providers charge tuition fees that still remain within an affordable range for middle-class income families. In stark contrast, the latest tuition fees for a Raffles-Northumbria undergraduate degree (two years’ diploma with Raffles plus the final year with Northumbria) have increased to about two million Thai Baht (approx. 57,000 USD or 54,000 Euro). The justification of such high fees in a local context deserves a separate discussion. On their website, Raffles Bangkok recommends to potential students to contact local banks for loans. Raffles’ corporate culture to live on borrowed credit seems to have been passed on to its customers and the institution obviously has no scruples to talk students into loans in excess of 50,000 USD. A tiny argument here is that Thai banks don’t approve student loans.

Then there is the choice of programs. From a business perspective, campus size matters. An institution with a large staff and student numbers such as Full Sail University in the US (15,700 students as per 2016) can offer an infinitely more efficient learning environment and more differentiated curricula as compared to smaller colleges.

Quality is next. A relevant syllabus requires continuous updating and improvement – not by self-declared expert groups but by contributions from all participants of the learning process. Keywords are qualitative course feedback, dedicated academic quality workgroups, and a cooperative curriculum design. Ideally, curricula should include interdisciplinary studies and additional electives. Again, such setups require a reasonable staff size to achieve functional complexity. At Raffles Bangkok, a faculty typically never exceeded more than two staff members inclusive of the Program Director. Lastly, there has not been a single senior management member at Raffles who has ever worked on a doctoral or postdoctoral level at a reputable university, so how can one possibly expect an understanding of academic culture at a managerial level?

Conclusion: How Private Education Providers Require Regulation

Let us not lose sight of the supervening issue as there is a huge difference in accountability. Government institutions have a national mandate to provide quality education to the public while private education providers such as Raffles can hide behind marketing campaigns, glossy brochures and high-flying promises to a privileged clientele. Unless for-profit education is regulated and subjected to external governmental auditing and binding obligations to consumer protection policies, such companies will continue to degrade the status of academia, hinder educational innovation and feed educational inequality. For-profits with high tuition fees inevitably promote a social system where financial status translates directly into degree entitlements to secure advanced life positions for the affluent. At the same time, governments in SE-Asia are taken to rigorous task to improve their public education systems and benchmark them against international standards as well. The burden of proof of quality is independent of the type of education provider.

Ultimately, Raffles has to be held accountable for its claims. This is when Raffles claims to provide quality education when in fact its franchise model compromises quality at the very core. It is when Raffles claims to support creativity and innovation but in fact, avoids investing in student-centred pedagogy, equipment and up-to-date curricula. It is when the Raffles group claims to operate at a university level but barely functions on a college level.

In order to protect the interests of students, parents and academic staff, government- and consumer protection agencies need to press for policies in the following areas:

  • Private education providers require regular quality audits by state agencies on a national level and, as they offer international programs, a separate audit by independent auditors on a transnational level to allow for international benchmarking.
  • In the case of potentially closing colleges unannounced or on short notice, for-profit providers with a history of financial mismanagement need to provide security bonds (or safety agreements) with local governments to protect parents’ investment in their children.
  • The academic staff deserves not only protection under local labour laws. Legally binding guidelines need to be set in place to ensure adequate working conditions for academics, such as relevant staff training, a salary structure based on competencies and holiday entitlements equivalent to academics in the public sector.
  • Parents and students need to be provided with transparent, detailed mandatory information about the college, such as staff qualifications (both professionally and pedagogically), facilities such as studios and up-to-date libraries, relevant external audits, faculty size, student numbers per faculty and typical class size, quality assurance policies, institutionalized student participation, alumni contacts and enrolment criteria.

In conclusion, postsecondary for-profit education cannot continue hiding under the smokescreen of unregulated education since it is publicly answerable to acceptable educational standards, quality assurance and accreditation on a national and international level.  Private institutions of Higher Learning cannot disguise themselves as reputable education providers while serving as conduits for wealthy elites to obtain prestigious degrees with little or no effort. Instead, they are, just like their public counterparts, taken to task to contribute more rigorously and creatively to the knowledge and service economy of the 21 century. Since universities serve as the apex of academic systems anywhere, evidence-backed study competencies (such as language proficiency, research-, critical thinking and social skills) are mandatory for students aiming to enter universities from a wide diversity of postsecondary institutions. To this extent, assessment for testing student competencies on postsecondary trajectories requires a formal and auditable format.

Raffles presents an excellent case study to demonstrate the effects of unregulated commercialization in education. In this light, Altbach, Reisberg and de Wit (2017) note in their study ‘RESPONDING TO MASSIFICATION – Differentiation in Postsecondary Education Worldwide’ fittingly that, “The burgeoning and often problematical private postsecondary sector needs to be categorized and regulations put into place to ensure that the private sector can serve the broader public interest.”

Future-oriented Social Change: Making Sense of MIT’s Theory U

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Why do national and international policies fail to solve global problems? How can we transform larger systems and empower sustainable social change? Picture Credit: Paul Souders/ National Geographic

The best way to familiarise oneself with Theory U (Scharmer & Senge, 2009) is to read the executive summary compiled by its inventor, Prof. Otto Scharmer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which can he found online here.

As a most general definition, Theory U is a field theory for evoking and maintaining sustainable social change. What distinguishes Theory U from most cognitive theories and research is its emphasis is on the inner cultivation of mindfulness as well as reflected attention and intention that change leaders bring to the situation. With government agencies, NGOs, multinational corporations and local communities embracing Theory U all over the world (such as e.g., Oxfam, UNICEF, the World Wildlife Fund, the Scottish Government, Unilever, Nissan, Hewlett-Packard, Daimler, Pricewaterhouse Coopers or Alibaba, to name a few), Theory U has already established itself as a powerful leader in social change initiation and management.

In the following, I like to compare Theory U with Problem-based Learning (PBL) as another well-established methodology to solve problems and to design new solutions. The comparison serves mainly to position Theory U under the aspect of social solutions development rather than to conclude a judgment. Secondly, I like to investigate the psychological foundations of Theory U. I will argue in favour of Theory U that the call for an open mind, open heart and open will has a profound grounding in contemporary social psychology.

Where research and policies currently fail

To start with, as an educator and scientist, I find it frustrating how the incredible amount of empirical research conducted on education in Germany, as an example, stands in no relation to the meagre progress achieved in public education systems. In contemporary educational research, students are measured as objects within learning processes. They perform tests, get videotaped, analysed and asked to fill out all sorts of questionnaires, but they are rarely invited as active participants in redesigning education, nor do researchers intend to.

In most empirical research, the human mind is regarded as a machine that isolates, stores and retrieves knowledge, not as a medium to interconnect wholes and one that involves spontaneity, compassion or working on wholes larger than the self, to quote Berkeley psychologist Prof. Eleanor Rosch. Scharmer calls this dilemma the ‘analysis paralysis’. Contemporary research deals predominantly with a data-driven description of phenomena, but to a lesser extent with prediction and most rarely with application and intervention. However, when dealing with people it is mind-states, awareness of cognitive habits, emotions and motivation that matter – not as a source of data collection to build hypothesised models but to serve as a shared information network to evoke collaborative social development.

The disconnect between qualitative and quantitative research

Empirical research in social sciences and applied psychology has the advantage to examine large datasets, especially when it comes to data on the international, national and regional level as well as across large institutions and networks.  As an action-based, face-to-face (and to this point re-humanising) methodology, the questions remains how prototyping via Theory U should or could be informed by findings from empirical studies. There appears to exist a great disconnect between qualitative and quantitative research and not much progress has been made to mediate both methodologies.

From the perspective of Theory U, the question arises how findings of wider social contexts (e.g., federal budget allocation trends, demographic changes or emerging technologies) affect small groups and individuals in their implementation of finalized prototypes, while from the perspective of empirical research the question occurs how collected data can be framed for stakeholders more meaningfully and collaboratively. For example, one could use findings of the international PISA studies to benchmark local schools, but on the other hand, it can be argued that the PISA datasets are still based on the paradigm of teacher-centered education and therefore are not applicable to inform educational reform. In the cited example, the admission of learner-centeredness as a central paradigm of contemporary pedagogy would entail a major overhaul of the PISA study.

Obviously, Theory U does not intend to compromise its human-centeredness. The question emerges how nested sub-processes could be established to mutually inform qualitative and quantitative research and development. A communal grassroots infrastructure for such an endeavour could widen the social scope of decision-making while rendering data collection more meaningful. Instead of traditional focus groups, solutions developed via Theory U could very well inform the direction of quantitative research. In return, quantitative research would be able to explore opportunities for a wider social implementation of successful prototypes, to connect deep data with big data.

A comparison between Theory U and PBL

PBL is a methodology to develop solutions on a primarily factual level. With its origins in medical education and applications in law, business, engineering and design PBL is focused on objects, systems and their usability. However, when it comes to design education (such as e.g., collaborative human-centred design) where mutual adjustment and collective-emergent solutions development play a central role, the borders between Theory U and Design Thinking become permeable. In terms of process stages, PBL and Theory U follow both the general cognitive paradigm of procedural information collection, information processing and solutions development.

In PBL, the learning process starts with the presentation of a client-based problem. In Theory U, learning is initiated in person by a case giver during case clinics. Both methodologies employ coaches (or facilitators) and both are working in the format of a structured group following a set of logical procedural steps. PBL, as well as Theory U, defer judgment since PBL works on the principle of open (cognitive and metacognitive) inquiry while Theory U is based on empathic listening. Both approaches work on the principle of creating new insights and new knowledge, which stands against the habitual application of prior knowledge and the tendency to suggest quick fixes based on prior experience. Solution development is subsequently driven by the question ‘What do I need to learn?’ rather than ‘What do I already know to solve the issue at hand?’. This is where most similarities between PBL and Theory U end.

As Theory U has been developed from the ground up as a cooperative, people-centred approach, theoretical analysis and research give way to an empathising and action-based methodology that aims for rapid co-created prototyping in the style of collaborative workshops. Secondly, the inner mind-states of participants and coaches cannot be separated or distanced from the process as objectified knowledge or content. Participants retain personal ownership of knowledge creation during the stages of downloading, presencing and performing. Due to the unearthing of ‘deep’ intersubjective data, far more psychological processes are involved in Theory U as compared to PBL which operates for the most part on cognitive and metacognitive processes.

Sensing’ entails anticipating the highest point of future possibilities while ‘presencing’ serves to connect to one’s inner source of inspiration in a tranquil and contemplative state. As psychologists, we could also describe ‘presencing’ as a truly autonomous state that is not compromised by fears, anxieties or pressured by external expectations (Ryan et al., 2012). Autonomy ís structured twofold in this understanding. Firstly, as authentic self-governance and secondly, as a means to keep autonomy open towards future possibilities while avoiding identity foreclosure by externalities.

Theory_U

Above: The process stages of Theory U. In essence, the theory relates social patterns of the past with the highest level of possibilities of the future. In the stage of ‘presencing’, social change leaders become self-aware of their intrinsic motivations and true motives. Credit: Presencing Institute

To me, this is one of the profound differences not only to PBL but to most empirical approaches where knowledge is created for client-oriented contexts. In Theory U, the client is us. To this extent, there are no right or wrong theories, it is just that we have to decide if we (a) intend to create new knowledge to serve external clients or if we (b) want to create knowledge in order to collaboratively transform institutions, communities and ecosystems. The choice of employed theory and methodology depends on the nature of desired outcomes.

Theory U and its link to psychological theories

But how is Theory U connected to psychology? Arguably, Scharmer’s call for an open mind, open heart and open will sounds both enticing as much as it appears, on face value, not grounded in any specific scientific approach. Theory U is a pragmatic action-based approach that follows an agentic psychology (Bandura, 2006) where participants create desired futures rather than limit themselves to become passive onlookers on their own behaviour. The philosophy questions the strength of behavioural and reductionist research approaches: How relevant and valid is empirical research if it cannot inform in situ real-world changes? The root of science, to argue with Aristotle, is to demonstrate causality. Obviously, Theory U works well as a pragmatic approach to facilitate real-world progress. But is there any science behind it?

For sceptics, I suggest connecting the following tried-and-tested ideas.

  1. The outer layer of Theory U follows, as mentioned, the universal information processing paradigm of information collection, processing and decision-making that we find in behavioral-cognitive psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
  2. The move from a field structure of the me-world (where facts serve to confirm and complement pre-existing patterns) to a field structure of the it-world (where facts prompt a revision of the current belief model) is well described in the concept of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957, 1964).
  3. The move from an external, factual worldview to an intersubjective perspective that includes empathising for and learning with others is well researched in person-centered therapy (Ellis, 1962; Mearns & Thorne, 1988; Rogers, 1959, 1975; see also Feltham & Horton, 2012) as well as Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977).
  4. The move to an operating field that evaluates reflectively the highest future possibility is part of human agency (Bandura, 2006), in particular, individual metacognition (Efklides, 2012, 2014; Flavell, 1979; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Moshman, 1995) and social metacognition (Briñol& DeMarree, 2012; Kim et al., 2013).
  5. Lastly, in differentiating micro-, meso-, macro- and mundo (global) spheres of social influence, Theory U follows in the footsteps of Urie Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Systems Theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).

To this extent, Theory U is deeply connected to well-researched psychological theories and represents a highly integrated approach to transforming lifeworld systems with other stakeholders. The subheader of Scharmer’s executive summary reads programmatically ‘Addressing the blind spot of our time’. The blind spot, so we learn, is mindful, self-aware and future-oriented leadership that connects to our most inner place from which we operate.

For Sharmer, the great quagmires of our time, which are the ecological-, social- and spiritual divide are just the symptoms of a deeper disconnect, which is the disconnect between self and nature (ecological divide), between self and others (social divide) and between present and future self (spiritual divide).

As a PBL practitioner, I see soft skills (the skills of a tutor, facilitator or coach) benefiting Theory U. Scharmer calls this ‘holding the space’ for others. For now, Theory U is certainly the most ambitious attempt to bring mind, heart and will together. From a psychological perspective, the oneness of personal identity with social development can be best described in thriving (Benson & Scales, 2009, McAdams, 2001, Ryan & Deci, 2000) which stands out as a bright prospect in an otherwise troubled world.

References

Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a Psychology of Human Agency. Perspectives on Psychological Science, (2). 164.

Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Benson, P. L., & Scales, P. C. (2009). The definition and preliminary measurement of thriving in adolescence. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4(1), 85–104.

Briñol, P., & DeMarree, K. G. (2012). Social metacognition. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979).The ecology of human development: Experiments by nature and design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Efklides, A. (2011). Interactions of Metacognition With Motivation and Affect in Self-Regulated Learning: The MASRL Model. Educational Psychologist, 46(1), 6-25. doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.538645

Efklides, A. (2014). How Does Metacognition Contribute to the Regulation of Learning? An Integrative Approach. PsihologijskeTeme/ Psychological Topics, 23(1), 1-30.

Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York: Stuart.

Feltham, C., & Horton, I. (2012). The SAGE handbook of counselling and psychotherapy. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Festinger, L. (Ed.). (1964). Conflict, decision, and dissonance (Vol. 3). Stanford University Press.

Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906-911. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.34.10.906

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center.

Kim, Y. R., Park, M. S., Moore, T. J., & Varma, S. (2013). Multiple levels of metacognition and their elicitation through complex problem-solving tasks. The Journal Of Mathematical Behavior, 32(3), 377-396. doi:10.1016/j.jmathb.2013.04.002

McAdams, D. P. (2001). The psychology of life stories. Review of General Psychology, 5(2), 100–1222.

Mearns, P., & Thorne, B. (1988). Person-Centred Counselling in Action (Counselling in Action series). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Rogers, C. (1959). A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-centered Framework. In (ed.) S. Koch, Psychology: A Study of a Science. Vol. 3: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Rogers, C. (1975). Empathic: An unappreciated way of being. The counseling psychologist, 5(2), 2-10.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.

Ryan, R. M., Legate, N., Niemiec, C. P., & Deci, E. L. (2012). Beyond illusions and defense: Exploring the possibilities and limits of human autonomy and responsibility through self-determination theory. In P. R. Shaver & M. Mikulincer (Eds.), Meaning, mortality, and choice: The social psychology of existential concerns (pp. 215-233). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. doi: 10.1037/13748-012

Scharmer, C. O., & Senge, P. M. (2009). Theory U: Leading from the future as it emerges: the social technology of presencing. San Francisco, Calif: Berrett-Koehler.

Schraw, G; & Dennison, R. (1994). Assessing metacognitive awareness. Contemporary Educational Psychology.19(4)(pp460-475)

Schraw, G., & Moshman, D. (1995). Metacognitive Theories. Educational Psychology Review, (4). 351.